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ARTICLES
ARE YOU CONTENT WITH
THE CONTENT?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IMPLICATIONS OF
WEBLOG PUBLISHING
ATTIYA MALIKt

I.

INTRODUCTION

WEBLOGS!! From the New York Times to National Public Radio,
1
the media is abuzz with this latest and greatest trend to hit Cyberspace.
Weblogs, more commonly known as blogs, chronicle whatever events,
ideas, or opinions, whether personal, social, political, or religious, the authors choose to discuss. Much like diaries or journals, they are a reverse

chronological account of the authors' thoughts and viewpoints. The popular media is describing weblogs as: "a new type of expression," 2 "there
has never been a better way to let your voice be heard,"3 "less intrusive
than a webcam but somehow more revealing," 4 and a "compelling alternative." 5 While they started out as personal diaries, weblogs are rapidly
being adopted for journalism, education, and business activities and are
t B.A., May 1989, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D., May 1997, New
England School of Law; L.L.M., January 2003, George Washington University School of
Law.
1. Bob Tedeschi, Internet Experts Wonder if Weblog Technology is a Powerful New
Media Species, or Just Another Fad, N.Y. Times C6 (Feb. 25, 2002); All Things Considered:
Popularity of Weblogs DP (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 13, 2002) (radio broadcast); Chris Taylor, Pssst. Wanna See My Blog? Impromptu Online Journals are Popping
Up All Over the Web. If I Can Figure Out How to Build One, You Can Too, Time 68 (Feb.
11, 2002); Howard Kurtz, Who Cares What You Think? Blog, and Find Out, Wash. Post
C01 (Apr. 22, 2002).
2. Tedeschi, supra n. 1, at C6.
3. Taylor, supra n. 1, at 68.
4. Id.
5. Kurtz, supra n. 1, at CO.
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serving as an alternative platform from which to communicate at the
global level.
The beauty of weblogs is that they are completely do-it-yourselfl Unlike web pages that require knowledge of computer code or programming
language, such as HyperText Markup Language ("HTML"), even the
most technologically challenged user can have their blog up and running
in no time at all. With the aid of any number of weblog software programs now available and by following the built-in templates and
prompts, you too can start blogging about the topic of your choice. You
choose the content, whether text or images, click the requisite buttons,
and, voila!, instant publishing! Your posting is available on your weblog
within seconds for all Internet viewers to read. You can add to or edit
your blog as often as you please, whether daily, hourly, or even minutes
apart. Adding links to your weblogs or following the links contained in
others' weblogs will introduce you to the growing communities of webloggers. These communities develop around common interests and topics,
thereby making it easier to find and join the ranks of like-minded
bloggers.
The publicity about weblogs has neglected to warn against the risks
of legal liability. Whether you want to impart words of wisdom or copy
something that caught your interest, the temptation to "borrow" is too
great and too easy in Cyberspace. Whereas the typical Internet user
may have heard of "copyright" or "trademark," they are unaware of the
complexities and nuances of these areas of law. The legal tests and standards may be too sophisticated for the average user. Even practitioners
and courts are grappling with what legal standards and interpretations
are to be applied in Cyberspace, thus, leading to irregular and unpredictable results.
Whether innocent or intentional, infringement of intellectual property rights poses serious consequences. As the Internet continues to impact daily life, intellectual property owners are stepping up monitoring
and enforcement efforts in order to preserve their rights. Technological
advancements are making it easier to track, identify, and hold liable,
individual users who are directly responsible for the infringing conduct.
Weblogs, too, will be subject to scrutiny. Legal discussions of Web sites
and web pages abound and, while these discussions could be applied to
weblogs, they would not adequately address all the issues.
The importance of weblogs lies in the fact that they differ from traditional web pages in several crucial ways. First, as mentioned, there is no
special computer language or code, such as HTML, necessary to post or
publish content on the Internet. The weblog software programs eliminate the need to learn computer programming that is necessary for the
construction of web pages. Second, whereas web pages require an intermediary, like a webmaster, systems administrator, or web content man-

20031

ARE YOU CONTENT WITH THE CONTENT?

ager to maintain presence on the Internet, there is no one standing
between you and your blog and there is no delay in posting your communication. Third, webloggers have direct and immediate access to the
weblog content so they can add, delete, or modify their postings as often
as they wish. Fourth, there is no one to monitor, filter, or censor what
you publish in your blog. What you want to say and when you want to
say it is all within your direct control. The significance of these critical
differences is that there is no one to screen weblog activities and, therefore, no one to warn webloggers against intellectual property rights violations. Moreover, the elimination of an intermediary means that there
is no one to shield webloggers from liability should intellectual property
owners find infringing content on weblogs.
The unexplored legal dimensions of the burgeoning cultural and
technical phenomena of weblogs are ripe with pitfalls for the uninformed. As a potential author or reader of weblogs, be aware that yours
and others intellectual property rights are at stake. As someone who
supplies software, equipment or facilities, or provides Internet access or
space for weblog hosting that enables others to create and maintain
weblogs, be alert because your participation may be viewed as contributing to the direct infringement of intellectual property rights by webloggers. As an advertiser or promoter of products or services on weblogs,
including fundraising activities, know that you too are exposed to liability. Finally, be advised that even something as innocuous as linking to
or from weblogs could lead you into trouble.
While cases like A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.6 have brought
intellectual property infringement liability to the forefront, the average
Internet user is unlikely to pay much attention because, after all, what
harm can a single individual cause, or more likely, they were not aware
that their actions amounted to violations of someone else's rights. To
assist legal scholars, the judiciary, and intellectual property and Internet experts, this paper attempts an analysis of intellectual property
law as it applies to weblog content. This paper may also serve as a guide
for all entities associated with weblogging and help them become familiar with key issues affecting their legal rights and responsibilities.
An examination of the parties that are being named as defendants,
the nature of their online conduct, and the mechanics of how information
is posted on the Internet may guide webloggers as they participate in
Internet activities. Although several areas of law may be triggered when
addressing weblog issues, including trade secrets and the First Amendment, this paper will focus on trademark and copyright law. Part II begins with an explanation of the concept, technology and uses of weblogs.
Parts III and IV provide a framework for theories of liability and de6. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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fenses under trademark and copyright law, respectively. Part V concludes with an overview of the future of weblogs, as they mature and
gain a firm foothold in Cyberspace.
II.

THE TECHNOLOGY
A.

DEFINITION

A weblog is a personal web page 7 or Web sites on the Internet 9 that
covers single or multiple topics that are of personal, professional, or social interest to its creator or author.1 0 In December 1997, Jorn Barger
came up with the name "weblog," which today is commonly known as a
"blog."11 A weblog is "web-based writing space," much like a real-world
diary or journal, which is used to write in as frequently as the author
desires and which grows over time as entries are added, deleted, or modi7. "Web Page" Webopedia, OnlineDictionaryfor Computerand Internet Terms <http:/
/www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "web page" is a document on the World
Wide Web that is identified by a unique URL (Uniform Resource Locator). Id. A URL is
the global address of a document or other resource on the World Wide Web. For example,
www.gwu.edu is the Internet address of George Washington University; "www" denotes
World Wide Web, "gwu" indicates the domain name or Internet protocol address where the
resource is located, and "edu" denotes that the site belongs to an educational institute.
"URL" Webopedia, Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms <http:l/
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002).
8. "Web Site" Webopedia, Online Dictionaryfor Computer and Internet Terms <http://
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "Web site" is a collection of web pages
and additional documents and files located on the World Wide Web that is owned and managed by an individual, company or organization. Id.
9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (defining "Internet" as "an international
network of interconnected computers ... now enabl[ing] tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the
world"); the "Internet" is a global network of computers that may be accessed via Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) such as America Online or Prodigy. It is a decentralized network
in which each Internet computer, called a host, is an independent unit. The operator of the
independent computer can select which Internet services to use and make available to the
global Internet community. Not all Internet servers are part of the World Wide Web. "Internet" Webopedia, Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms <http://
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "server" is a computer or device on a
network that manages the resources of the network. "Server" Webopedia: Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms <http://www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14,
2002). For example, a file server stores files of any user on the network, a print server runs
the network printers, a network server directs the traffic on the network, and a database
server processes database queries. A single server can execute several programs and functions at once but, often, a server is dedicated to perform a specific task. Id.
10. eTopics, Computer Research & Technology I 1-2 <http://www.crt.net.auletopics/
blogs.html> (accessed Feb. 8, 2002).
11. Rebecca Blood, Weblogs: A History and Perspective, Rebecca's Pocket %1
1-2 <http:l!
www.rebeccablood.net/essays/weblog-history.html> (accessed Sept. 7, 2000). The terms
"weblog" and "blog" are used interchangeably. Id. The terms "weblogger" and "blogger" are
also used interchangeably and refer to one who creates or authors a weblog. Id.
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fied.' 2 Its content can be composed of text, graphics, and photographs,
as well as links13 to other weblogs and Web sites. The original definition
of weblog, a Web site containing links and personal commentary, has
evolved into the current description of weblog as a Web site that is constantly updated in reverse chronological order, with the newest material
posted at the top of the page and the oldest at the bottom.14
B.

HISTORY

Weblogs have a short but very active history. Tim Berners-Lee, who
designed and created the World Wide Web ("the Web"), 15 wanted the
Web to serve as a platform for reading and writing and came up with the
concept of the Web site as a way of enabling users to do so. 1 6 He created
the first Web site, which was also the first weblog as it included his comments and provided links to other Web sites.' 7 The Web was seen as a
tool to connect to and communicate with people and as a forum in which
the free-flow of ideas and information could take place.' 8 Initially, progress toward this vision was very slow. The early weblogs could only be
produced by individuals who had knowledge of computer code, like
12. Chris Ashley, A Place to Write, Nothing Fancy, Weblogging: Another Kind of Web
Site 5 <http://interactiveu.Berkeley.edu:8000/ca/stories/storyreader$192> (accessed July
20, 2001).
13. "Hypertext Link" Webopedia, Online Dictionaryfor Computer and Internet Terms,
<http://www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "link" (also called hypertext link)
is highlighted text, picture, program, logo, etc. on a web page that, when selected, enables
instant access to another web page. Links are useful for navigating the Internet because
they allow a user to jump from one document to another simply by clicking on the highlighted object. Id. For example, while reading the description for the Constitution Law
course offered at the George Washington University Law School, I can link to faculty

profiles to read about the professors who teach the course, link to the bookstore for the
price of the required textbook, or link to an organization or publication about the course.
14. Blood, supra n. 11, at 17.
15. eTopics, supra n. 10. World Wide Web is a system of Internet servers that support
documents specifically formatted in the HTML (HyperText Markup Language) script. Web
browsers or software applications such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator enable access to the World Wide Web. World Wide Web is synonymous with the
Internet. See "World Wide Web" Webopedia, Online Dictionaryfor Computer and Internet
Terms <http://www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002).
16. Id. (stating that the Web is the "best known category of communication over the
Internet ... which allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote
computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites" and that it
.consists of a vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world").
17. Dave Winer, The History of Weblogs
4 <http://newhome.weblogs.com/historyofweblogs> (accessed Oct. 12, 2001). Berners-Lee's first Web site, http://info.cern.ch/, has
been archived at the World Wide Web Consortium to preserve its content. Id. Examples of
early weblogs include NCSA's What's New, Netscape's What's New, Scripting News, Robot
Wisdom, Realm, and CamWorld.
18. Blood, supra n. 11, at 1 24.
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HTML, and knew how to make a Web site. 19 They used weblogs to publicly convey thoughts, opinions, essays, and commentary on a wide variety of subject matter. Links and personal commentary in weblogs
enabled people to reference, emphasize, or criticize particular points they
20
were making.
Technological advancements have significantly revolutionized the
process of setting up and using weblogs. Knowledge of programming
code or installation of server software or scripting languages is no longer
required. 2 1 Modem weblog tools give a user complete control over the
total look and feel of the weblog, from the writing and editing to its location and, best of all, the results are instantaneously posted on the weblog
for all to see. 2 2 Anyone with access to the Internet can publish information and make it available to the general public or limit it to those willing
to pay for it. 2 3 Examples of publishers include individuals, commercial
and non-commercial entities, educational institutions, and government
24
agencies.
Today's weblog is usually community-based, meaning that it "takes
place within a community of other webloggers who share a common interest." 25 The community can be small and consist of only a few individuals, or it can be large and include hundreds of people. For example, a
community may be composed of family, friends, or work colleagues. The
"community is the primary audience, and the weblogger quite likely has
two roles, being both a writer for this community and an audience member of the community members' weblogs, which point to, comment on,
and reference each other."2 6
C.

TYPES OF WEBLOGS

Original weblogs were filter-style weblogs that "included a mix of
links, commentary, and personal notes."27 The Web is such a vast and
overwhelming source of information that this style served "a valuable
filtering function for the readers" because "the web has been, in effect,
pre-surfed for them." 28 The weblogger "filters through the mass of infor19. Id.
20. Id.
21. eTopics, supra n. 10.
22. Ashley, supra n. 12.
23. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 853.
24. Id (discussing, in footnote 9, how the Court recognized that "individual users and
small community organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal 'home
pages,' the equivalent of individualized newsletters about that person or organization").
25. Ashley, supra n. 12, at 6.
26. Id.
27. Blood, supra n. 11, at 12.
28. Id. at 9114.
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mation packaged daily for our consumption and picks out the interesting, the important, the overlooked, and the unexpected."2 9 The filter
method helped readers save the time and hassle of sorting through the
maze of Internet Web sites and guided them toward topics of interest
that have been pre-selected and organized into a weblog.
The filter-style weblogs and developing technology gave way to the
journal-style or blog-style weblogs. 30 This style "has a more free-form interface combined with absolute ease of use."3 1 The free-form functioned
as a vehicle for self-expression and gave individuals a voice on a global
level. "These blogs, often updated several times a day, were instead a
record of the blogger's thoughts: something noticed on the way to work,
notes about the weekend, a quick reflection on some subject or another."3 2 Links enabled webloggers to connect to and converse with
33
other webloggers on a number of subjects.

D. How WEBLOGS WORK
The weblog concept was slow to catch on but exploded with full force
with the advent of do-it-yourself technology. According to one source, the
number of weblogs has grown steadily from a reported handful in 1998 to
twenty-three in 1999 to thousands today.3 4 In July 1999, the first free
build-your-own-weblog tool called Pitas was introduced, followed by the
launch of Blogger, Gorksoup, and other services that made publishing
35
quick and easy.
An individual starts by registering and opening an account with one
of the many weblog service providers or hosting services, such as Blogger
or Manila, and constructing a weblog at the host's site.3 6 The individual
can use the built-in templates or pre-designed formats offered by most
hosting services or create their own templates to build every page of a
weblog and give it the look and feel they desire. 3 7 The pages are then
29. Id. at

19.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Blood, supra n. 11, at $ 12.
33. Id.
34. eTopics, supra n. 10, at %1
3.
35. Blood, supra n. 11, at
4. Other services include Edit This Page, Velocinews,
Metafiler, Manila, Radio UserLand, Weblogger, and LiveJournal.
36. "Host" Webopdia, Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms <http://
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "host" is a computer system that containing data which is accessed by a user working at a remote location or terminal. Id. The
host has a unique Internet address to which the user connects via a modem and telephone
or cable lines. Id. For example, a company that hosts a web server provides the hardware,
software, and communication lines necessary to access the server, but the content on the
server may be supplied by another.
37. Ashley, supra n. 12, at 1 8-9.
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automatically archived and sequentially linked, which makes it easy to
navigate the site and eliminates the need to know the programming code
necessary to manually create and upload a traditional web page. 38 A
weblog creator also has the option of designing the weblog to be interactive "so that others can join and leave comments or ask questions in the
39
discussion area."
Once setup, the weblogger can start writing. "Typically, each day
the writer flips the front page ("flip" is Manila-speak for archiving the
current front page and starting with a new day's fresh, clean space to
write in), writes in a form within the browser window and clicks the Submit button. Voila, instant publishing!"40 Along with text, one can also
incorporate images, graphics, photographs, and links into the weblog. A
web browser 41 manages the weblog at anytime from anywhere, and as
often as preferred, the weblogger can log on to the service provider's site,
42
locate their weblog and add, delete, revise, or update the content.
Some weblog service providers neither impose restrictions on the
content being posted on weblogs nor require linking. 43 For example,
Blogger presents an empty box into which a writer types and then, with
the click of a button, Blogger posts the material exactly as written,
archives the entry in the proper place, and presents the writer with another empty box for the next entry. There is no ongoing monitor of the
weblog content or any voluntary investigation of potentially infringing
content unless a complaint has been made to the service provider.
E.

How

WEBLOGS ARE USED

Weblogs originated as personal journals to write about whatever the
heart desired. Soon thereafter, weblogs were being applied in other
ways. Several areas have been identified in which weblog technology is
being incorporated to significantly impact the use and growth of the
Internet.
One area of weblog use is content, information and knowledge management. Weblogs can manage the content of a Web site, serve as a vehicle for gathering, organizing, and analyzing information, as well as
warehouse knowledge to be accessed and shared by many. 44 For example, a public school may use a weblog service provider to host weblogs on
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id.
41. "Web Browser" Webopdia, Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms
<http://www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). A "web browser" is a software application, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer, that is used to locate and display web pages.
42. Ashley, supra n. 12, at 9.
43. Blood, supra n. 11, at 16.
44. Ashley, supra n. 12, at T 9.
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specific topics and provide resources for teachers, or a public library may
have a weblog of stories and Web sites about technological advancements
in library services. Work colleagues may use a weblog for a variety of
work-related tasks such as exchanging ideas and information, providing
feedback, and delegating and organizing assignments.
A second area is community building. Weblogs can encourage community development and participation by giving members immediate access to each other and connecting readers and writers who have common
interests. 45 Weblogs give members the ease and flexibility of moving
from topic to topic, of controlling the direction and flow of the topic, and
of storing the ideas generated. "[Linking from one weblog to another is
a way of creating threads and building community."4 6 Many tools are
available to track links, provide lists of the most read and recently updated weblogs, and automatically provide current information on topics
or searches. The purpose of this technology is to save time by bringing to
readers and writers the content and trends on the Internet that are of
specific interest to them.
The third area of weblog use is publishing and journalism. The Internet has enabled everyone to voice their opinion and to be heard.
Weblogs are a new platform for writers to write and publish while having
a worldwide audience of readers at their disposal. The low cost and ease
of self-publishing has revolutionized journalism. It has led to the examination of how news is produced, the impact amateur journalists will have
on news reporting, and the rising popularity of peer-to-peer journalism
in which the members of the weblog community write for each other so
47
that, over time, expertise and reputations are established.
Weblog journalists are free to choose their topics, determine quality
and quantity of the writing, update and change viewpoints as often as
they please, and remain in constant communication with their readers.
More importantly, weblogs are unedited and unmediated, and the journalist, whether professional or amateur, is the ultimate reporter, columnist, analyst, and publisher.4 8 Due to the ease and speed of publishing,
weblog journalism often tends to be raw, opinionated, honest, and pas49
sionate, sometimes at the expense of accuracy.
A fourth use of weblogs has been in teaching and learning. Educators are devising ways to incorporate weblogs into the classroom to discuss topics, post questions and answers, and share news.5 0 Teachers
45. Id. at
6-7.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1 10.
48. J.D. Lasica, Blogging as a Form of Journalism, Online Journalism Review
<http://ojr.usc.edu/content/cfm?request=585> (accessed May 24, 2001).
49. Id. at 9 18.
50. Ashley, supra n. 12, at 11.
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and students may use weblogs to post assignments and announcements,
research and write, plan and maintain projects, and engage in peer-topeer journalism between classes or schools. Teachers can exchange news
about education and teaching and students can learn about and discuss
school subjects, extra-curricular activities, and social issues. Parents too
can use weblogs to keep up with a child's education and interests. Educators are even using weblogs to manage their courses as an alternative
to formal course management systems, which have been criticized as
"rigid, top-down, hierarchical, and follow[ing] the paradigm of desks in a
row with the teacher in front," and lacking in flexibility for collaborative,
51
interactive, and inquiry-based learning.
Whether it is education, work, journalism, or research, weblogs are
already affecting how we communicate with others. The business community is also awaking to the potential of weblogs. Companies that currently have official Web sites may incorporate weblogs into their overall
marketing and sales strategy to attract customers. 5 2 Traditional methods of building web pages and Web sites, requiring knowledge of programming code and assistance of systems administrators and
webmasters to facilitate posting of content on the Internet, may soon be
a thing of the past. Given the simplicity and ease of use, weblogs are
paving the way for the technologically challenged to participate in Cyber
activities.
The concept of weblogs has far reaching implications and the full
potential and application of weblogs remain to be seen. Also unexplored
are the legal ramifications of weblog activity. The two major intellectual
property topics of future concern are trademarks and copyright. As with
traditional web pages and Web sites, weblog content is also susceptible
to infringing the rights of intellectual property owners. The following
sections explore the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable conduct
that weblogs must respect and the level of judicial scrutiny that may be
applied should an infringement action be filed against a weblog.
III.

A.

TRADEMARKS
INTRODUCTION

The Internet, as the modern forum for the marketplace of ideas, enables participation in the free-flow and exchange of information at virtu51. Id. WebCT and Blackboard are two course management systems that have been
criticized by educators.
52. Time <http://www.time.com/time/columnist/mideastmonitor/article/0,9565,349412,
OO.html> (accessed Dec. 17, 2002). Time Magazine columnist, Tony Karon, has a weblog
that is used to update readers about various issues. Id.
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ally no cost. 53 Weblogs are the newest medium of communicating with
the global community. Media attention is piquing people's curiosity such
that Internet users are experimenting with weblogs. With this increased
use comes the potential for references to trademarks. A trademark is a
word, name, symbol, or device that is used to identify and distinguish the
source of goods or services. 5 4 Trademarks are a shorthand method of
conveying information about a specific product or service. 5 5 Trademarks
may be incorporated into weblogs for a variety of reasons. Some references to trademarks are permitted by law, while others are authorized
by trademark owners upon request. When trademarks are included in
weblogs, they may create the impression that the weblog and its content
are somehow associated with the trademark and that a relationship exists between the owners of the mark and the weblog. If this association
is not approved by law or by the trademark owner, then the use of the
mark in the weblog may cause confusion among some visitors to the
weblog.
Trademark owners' lack of control over the unauthorized use of their
marks has led many to take legal action and vigorously defend their
marks. Trademark law has two main objectives. The first is to reduce
consumer confusion as to the origin, affiliation, or sponsorship of products or services by preventing the unauthorized use of trademarks that
the public has come to associate with specific goods or services. 56 The
second is to recognize and protect the investment businesses make in
developing and promoting their trademarks and provide remedies for infringement. 5 7 Trademarks are recognized as property in and of themselves, separate from the products and services they are associated with,
and are protected by federal and state law, regardless of whether the
marks are registered or unregistered. 58
Since the weblog concept is still in its infancy, no lawsuits have been
reported against authors, owners, or service providers of weblogs. Therefore, legal analysis is aided by analogies to such Internet cases as the
liability of Internet service providers, software developers, web hosts,
linking Web sites, consumer opinion Web sites, and banner advertisers.
In balancing the competing interests of protecting the rights of trademark owners while preserving the public's right to freely access informa53. Leslie C. Rochat, "I See What You're Saying:" Trademarked Terms and Symbols as
Protected Consumer Commentary in Consumer Opinion Web sites, 24 Seattle U. L. Rev.
599, 600 (2000).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
55. Rochat, supra n. 53, at 600.
56. Bryce J. Maynard, The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1303, 1310-11 (2000).
57. Id. at 1309, 1311.
58. Rochat, supra n. 53, at 606.
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tion, courts apply the same traditional tests and standards for
determining trademark causes of action in Internet cases as those that
are used in real-world cases. A weblog may incorporate any or all of
these issues and will be bound by the same judicial precedence.

B.

SPOTTING THE ISSUES IN WEBLOGS

When constructing weblogs, there are several pitfalls to be aware of.
Weblogs may use text, images, graphics, photographs, and links that
contain trademarks that have not been authorized for use. References to
the names of products or services must be distinguished from references
to the trademarks themselves. For instance, in discussing consumer
preference for Coke versus Pepsi, it's one thing to use the names "Coke"
and "Pepsi" and another to use the trademarked symbols associated with
each product. Linking consumer opinion Web sites, domain names, and
banner advertisements are but some examples of how trademarks may
be incorporated in weblogs. In analyzing a case involving weblogs, a
court is likely to respond by examining how other courts have handled
these and other Internet activities before deciding the fate of the case at
hand.
Linking has given structure and organization to the disparate types
of information available on the Web and has made navigating the Internet simpler and quicker. The Internet is such an enormous resource
that finding the right information can be a time consuming and tedious
process. Once a user locates Web sites that are on point, the search becomes easier because the sites accessed usually contain links to other
related Web sites. Weblogs are primarily supported by links to other
weblogs. In fact, linking is the hallmark of weblogging and contributes
to the growth and expansion of weblog communities. 5 9
The routine use of linking has raised legal questions about the practice of linking without obtaining the permission of the linked-to Web
site's owner. Particular focus has been on the commercial and non-commercial nature of the Web sites involved and whether the links are to a
Web site's home page or to some other content buried in the linked-to
Web site. 60 Although trademark law does not explicitly prohibit linking,
precautions can be taken to limit liability, such as getting the linked-to
Web site owner's consent or disclaiming any affiliation or sponsorship
61
between the linked-from and the linked-to Web sites.
59. Ashley, supra n. 12.
60. Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing PotentialLiability Associated With Linking and Framing on the World Wide Web, 8 CommLaw Conspectus 85, 87 (2000). A "home page" is the
main page of a Web site and serves as a table of contents to other documents on the Web
site. "Home Page" Webopedia, Online Dictionaryfor Computer and Internet Terms <httpJ/
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 16, 2002).
61. Tsilas, supra n. 60, at 90.
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Consumer opinion Web sites exist for the purpose of criticizing or
commenting about a specific company's products or services and often
contain the company's trademarks. 62 They may be created by disgruntled customers or employees who want to share their views with the Internet public and the company under attack, and they may invite the
public to contribute their own experiences and opinions. 63 As such, they
are similar to weblogs that may also be used to broadcast the authors'
views about goods or services and the businesses associated with them.
Most consumer opinion Web sites do not rise to the level of trademark
infringement and are excused under the fair use defense. 6 4 Complications arise when these Web sites engage in commercial activity that benefits their owners or operators.
Domain names identify Internet protocol addresses of particular
web pages and Web sites. They can be composed of names, letters, and
numbers that can usually help identify the entities to which the web
pages and Web sites belong. For example, the domain name "gwu.edu"
designates the location of the George Washington University Web site.
Disputes arise when non-trademark holders use trademarks as domain
names without first obtaining the permission of the marks' owners.
There is much case law on domain name disputes, some of which is mentioned below. Bloggers must bear in mind these types of trademark disputes when selecting the names of weblogs. Weblog names must not
confuse or mislead Internet viewers as to the source or sponsorship of the
weblog nor must they hint at an unauthorized affiliation between the
weblog and a trademark.
Banner advertisements are a form of Internet advertising that generate revenue for the Web site owners. A seller of products or services
buys advertising space on a Web site by purchasing "keywords" from a
commercial entity providing search engine services, like Netscape, Excite, or AltaVista. 6 5 When a user types a search word or term, an advertisement for the company that purchased that keyword appears as a
banner above the search results. 66 Keywords that are sold for banner
advertisements are often trademarks that are used without the permission of the trademarks' owners. 6 7 For example, the word "SONY' may
be sold to a competing electronics retailer so that consumers searching
for Sony products may get advertisements from competitors of Sony.
62. Maynard, supra n. 56, at 1346.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1347; see discussion infra Part III.F.1.
65. Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information Superhighway: Liability Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarksto Key Internet BannerAds, 41
B.C. L. Rev. 847, 849 (2000).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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When a trademark is keyed to a banner ad, it is embedded in the
software program of the search engine and is never visible to users of
that search engine. 68 This hidden use dictates the results of a search
and often diverts visitors to Web sites that otherwise might not be visited.6 9 Weblogs, too, have the capability to incorporate banner advertisements. Whether the weblog sponsors, solicits or promotes a product or
service, there is a possibility that if a trademark is infringed, the weblog
owner may be a potential defendant in a lawsuit. Although most weblogs
currently do not include advertisements, this could change in the future,
as weblogging becomes more sophisticated.
C.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

The Federal TrademarkAct, commonly called the Lanham Act, provides a cause of action for trademark infringement of federally registered
trademarks. 70 Under the Act, a defendant may be liable for trademark
infringement when she
use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
71
to deceive.
The plaintiff must prove (a) the existence of a valid trademark and (b)
that the defendant's use causes a likelihood of confusion. 7 2 The focus of
a trademark infringement claim is on the likelihood of confusion,
"whether the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about
the source of the products." 7 3 Courts decide whether consumers are
likely to be confused about the origin, affiliation, or sponsorship of the
74
allegedly infringing trademark.
The complexity of the Internet has forced courts to acknowledge that
the likelihood of confusion analysis must be flexible enough to accommodate the unique problems of trademark use in Cyberspace. In Brookfield
Communications,Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that "[wie must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a
68. Id. at 849-50.
69. Id.
70. Federal Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
71. Id. § 1114 (1)(a).
72. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cal.
1998).
73. Brookfield Commun., Inc. v. W. Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053
(9th Cir. 1999); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition
§ 2:8 (4th ed. 1996) (describing likelihood of confusion as keystone of trademark
infringement).
74. Id. at § 23:1 (explaining the likelihood of confusion test).
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flexible approach." 75 Should a weblog creator, owner, or hosting service
be sued, the legal analysis will entail the application of the following
standards for determining trademark infringement.
1.

Valid Trademark

Federal registration of a trademark is prima facie evidence of the
validity of the mark.7 6 This presumption may be rebutted by proof of
prior use of the mark in commerce by the defendant. 77 "The first to use a
mark is deemed the 'senior' user and has the right to enjoin 'junior' users
from using the confusingly similar marks in the same industry and market or within the senior user's natural zone of expansion." 78 Unregistered trademarks are also protected by the Lanham Act upon proof that
significant financial investment has been made in developing and promoting the mark over an extended time period. 79 In the case of weblogs,
this element may be easily proved by the plaintiff and may not be much
of an issue.
2.

Likelihood of Confusion

The most frequently used test for evaluating likelihood of confusion
is the Second Circuit's "Polaroid Factors" test.8 0 That court announced
an eight-factor analysis for determining the likelihood of confusion between two marks: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products
or services; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap between the products or services; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the
defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark; (7) the quality of the
defendant's product or service; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers. 8 '
a.

Strength of the Mark

This factor generally favors the plaintiff when the trademark is in
continuous use over time, the mark is registered and thus considered
nationally recognized, or a significant financial investment has been
made in developing and promoting the mark.8 2 Where a mark is a com75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1054.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id.
Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. LeadingAuthorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488,

494 (E.D. Va. 1999); Maynard, supra n. 56, at 1311.
80. Maynard, supra n. 56, at 1312.
81. PolaroidCorp. v. PolaroidElecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir. 1961).

82. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. Plaintiff owned federally registered
trademarks "Bally," "Bally Total Fitness," and "Bally's Total Fitness" that were used in
connection with its health club business. Id. Defendant created a Web site called "Bally
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bination of words such that consumers come to associate the combination
with the plaintiff, the use of the individual words alone may be sufficiently weak and unlikely to cause consumer confusion, since consumers
would not attribute the individual words to the plaintiff.8 3 A trademark
used in a weblog will be analyzed to determine whether it is strong
enough to be recognized by consumers as belonging to the plaintiff.
b.

Degree of Similarity Between the Two Marks

This element "will always be an important factor."8 4 "The more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning, the greater
the likelihood of confusion" and the marks "must be considered in their
entirety and as they appear in the marketplace."8 5 A weblogger might
use the plaintiffs mark identically or with sufficient modifications so as
to make the two marks dissimilar. If the two trademarks are different or
if they are similar but the parties are in different geographic locations,
the likelihood of confusion is doubtful.8 6 Depending on the defendant's
use, this element may benefit either party.
In Brookfield Communications, this factor weighed in plaintiffs
favor because "moviebuff.com," the protected mark, and "MovieBuff," the
accused mark, were "for all intents and purposes, identical in terms of
sight, sound, and meaning."8 7 The Ninth Circuit determined that the
two marks: (a) only varied slightly in appearance, (b) were pronounced
the same way, and (c) were likely to cause consumers to think that the
company "Moviebuff' operated the Web site "moviebuff.com." 88 However, in Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, the accused mark
"Bally sucks" was held not to be similar to plaintiffs mark "Bally," where
the defendant superimposed the word "sucks" on plaintiffs logo "Bally"
such that it was "impossible to see Bally's mark without seeing the word
sucks" that was dedicated to criticizing plaintiffs business and that stated "Bally Total
Fitness Complaints! Un-Authorized." Id.
83. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 491, 498. Plaintiff owned and used
an unregistered trademark "Washington Speakers Bureau" and the defendant used a substantial portion of this combination of words in their domain names "www.washington
speakers.com," "www.washington-speakers.com," "www.washingtonspeakers.net," and
"www.washington-speakers.net." Id. at 491.
84. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1054.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1042, 1055. Plaintiff was a developer and marketer of software for the professional entertainment industry and owned federal trademark registration for
"MovieBuff." Id. at 1056. Defendant was a national video rental chain of stores and owns
the trademark "The Movie Buffs Movie Store." Id. Defendant started a Web site under the
domain name "moviebuff.com" that contained information about the entertainment industry and included the terms "moviebufi" and "moviebuff.com" in its metatags. Id.
88. Id. at 1055.
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'sucks,"' therefore, the modification "cannot be considered a minor
change."8 9
When trademarks are composed of common or descriptive words, the
degree of similarity that is permitted between the protected and the accused mark is greater than that allowed for when uncommon or nondescriptive words are used.90 "When common words that are likely to be
chosen to describe similar products form part of a mark, use of those
words in a competing product's mark will not cause confusion unless the
secondary meaning of the first mark is so extensive in the relevant market that any use of these terms will lead to consumer confusion as to the
source of the product." 9 1
For example, the trademark "Washington Speakers Bureau" consists of common words that may be used individually to describe services
offered by someone else such that using a portion of this combination is
not likely to cause consumers to associate the individual words with
plaintiffs mark. 9 2 "Washington," "speakers," and "bureau" are separate
words in the English language that may be used in any order to sell
products or services without risking the likelihood of confusion. Other
common words such as "playboy" and "playmate," which have independent dictionary meaning, may be used where they are not intended to
identify the source of products or services and are not used as trademarks. 9 3 Distinguishing a trademark that contains common words by
different font, size, color, and style, without using logos or symbols asso94
ciated with the plaintiff, will amount to dissimilarity of the marks.
89. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
90. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 499.
93. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (1999).
Plaintiff was an adult publishing and entertainment company that owned the federally
registered trademarks "Playboy" and "Playmate." Defendants sold advertising space for
banner ads to which defendants "keyed" or linked certain search terms so that when a user
typed in a specific search, advertisements keyed to those search terms popped up on the
screen. Defendants keyed many commonly used search words related to adult entertainment to numerous adult entertainment advertisements. Court allowed use of "playboy"
and "playmate" because there was no evidence to support plaintiffs contention that the

words were used for their trademark value.
94. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1082-83 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Plaintiff owned federally registered trademarks "Playboy," "Playmate," "Playmate of the
Month," and "Playmate of the Year" and maintained the Web sites "playboy.com" and
"cyber.playboy.com." Defendant, a self-employed model and spokesperson, operated a Web
site "terriwelles.com" and used the marks "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981," "Playmate
of the Year 1981," and "PMOY '81'" in the visual title, metatags, banner advertisements,
and as watermarks. The court held that the defendant's version of the trademarks was not
similar to that of the plaintiffs.
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Uncommon or made-up words that are used as trademarks have a
stronger argument for likelihood of confusion if used by others because
they were coined specifically to identify the trademark owner's goods or
services. Trademarks such as "Kodak," "Rolex" and "Exxon" have no
meaning separate from the products or services they represent. In the
minds of consumers, these marks become so associated with particular
goods or services of certain suppliers that it would be difficult to justify
their use by anyone else, regardless of whether distinguishing color, font,
logos, or symbols are used.
c.

Competitive Proximity of the Products or Services

This factor analyzes whether the parties offer related products or
services and whether they use similar marketing channels. If the trademark is used on competing goods or services, then the likelihood of consumer confusion is high and this element weighs in the plaintiffs
favor. 9 5 Alternatively, if unrelated products or services are involved,
then the likelihood of consumer confusion is less and this factor benefits
96
the defendant.
Courts recognize that the use of the Internet as a marketing and
advertising tool gives rise to many types of consumer confusion. 9 7 Entering a Web site takes minimal effort, thus, "Web surfers are more likely to
be confused as to the ownership of a [Web site than traditional patrons
of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a store's ownership." 98 A customer may mistakenly believe that the defendant's site is affiliated with
or authorized by the plaintiff, that the defendant and plaintiff are related companies, or that the plaintiffs site does not exist and is replaced
by the defendant's site, in which case, the customer may remain and look
around. 9 9 This "initial interest confusion" gains the defendant a customer who would have never reached the defendant's site had they not
95. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1055. Defendant's use was held to create a likelihood of consumer confusion because both parties: (a) offered competing products and services that related to movies in the entertainment industry, (b) provided databases that
were searchable by consumers looking for details on films, and (c) competed for business
from overlapping consumers. In Washington Speakers Bureau, the parties were also found
to offer identical services, plaintiff represented speakers exclusively, while defendant acted
as a "broker" with other agencies to arrange speakers for events it helped organize. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
96. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1055; Bally Total Fitness,29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
The court did not find the parties marketed competing services because the plaintiff was in
the health club business and operated a commercial Web site that advertised it's services,
whereas, the defendant's site only offered consumer opinion about the plaintiffs business.
97. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1057.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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been looking for the plaintiffs site to begin with. 10 0 Thus, the defendant
may be held to have misappropriated the plaintiffs goodwill by using the
plaintiffs mark to lure consumers to defendant's own Web site. 10
If the purpose of the defendant's Web site is to provide consumer
commentary, rather than to market goods or services, a defendant may
not be found to have appropriated the plaintiffs mark. 10 2 Parties that
are not in the same line of business are not competitors and the use of a
trademark may be appropriate, even though both use the Internet as a
marketing channel for their respective businesses. 10 3 But, a court may
find that parties who have Internet presence are in close proximity to
each other and contribute to the likelihood of consumer confusion be10 4
cause their Web sites compete for the same audience on the Internet.
Currently, most weblogs do not involve the purchase or sale of products or services so the competitive proximity of products or services is not
much of an issue. However, this could change once it is fully realized
that weblogs are an alternative form of sales and marketing. Entities
that lack the resources to participate in electronic commerce using traditional methods, such as purchasing sophisticated hardware and software
and hiring computer programmers or systems administrators to install
and maintain an online business, are likely to turn to weblogging. The
do-it-yourself technology of constructing weblogs may be an economical
enticement for establishing a Web presence.
d.

Likelihood that Plaintiff Will Bridge the Gap Between the Products
or Services

This element examines whether the plaintiff will undertake activities that the defendant is involved in and offer products or services to
consumers in that same market. It favors the plaintiff if there is a strong
likelihood that plaintiff will expand its business to include the defendant's market. 10 5 If the parties already offer competing products and
services or they do not intend to enter each other's markets at all, then
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
103. Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
104. PlannedParenthoodFedn. of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 at *37
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997). Plaintiff was a non-profit, reproductive health care organization
that owned the registered trademark "Planned Parenthood" and operated a Web site
"ppfa.org." Defendant, the host of the radio program "Catholic Radio" and an anti-abortion
activist, operated several Web sites including "plannedparenthood.com." The home page of
the Web site first greeted visitors with the message "Welcome to the PLANNED
PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!," then showed the cover of a book entitled The Cost of Abortion, by Lawrence Roberge, followed by other information about the Web site.
105. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1060.
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they will not bridge the gap and this factor becomes irrelevant. 10 6
Weblogs have the ability to offer products and services that overlap with
those associated with a trademark. The potential that a trademark
owner will bridge the gap to include the Internet market or operate its
own weblog to sell goods or services may be sufficient enough to warrant
this element in the plaintiffs favor.
e.

Evidence of Actual Confusion

This factor benefits the plaintiff if it can be shown that the consuming public is likely to mistake that specific products or services are affiliated with particular sources. Evidence of actual confusion gives
presumption to the likelihood of confusion. 10 7 "[A] mere possibility is not
enough: 'There must be a substantial likelihood that the public will be
confused.'"' 0 8 There is evidence of consumer confusion if the domain
name and the welcoming message on the home page of a Web site indicate that the user has accessed the plaintiffs Web site when, in fact, they
have entered the defendant's site.' 0 9 For instance, someone looking for
the Pepsi Web site using the domain name "pepsi.com" expects to arrive
at Pepsi's official Web site and be greeted with the familiar Pepsi colors
and logos. Actual confusion may result if, instead of providing information about Pepsi products, the Web site advertises alternative or competing beverages or contains anti-Pepsi sentiments.
If there is no evidence of actual consumer confusion during all the
time that the trademark is used, then this element favors the defendant. 110 A consumer opinion Web site is not expected to cause actual
consumer confusion if, for example, the mark is superimposed with the
word "sucks" or the Web site states that it is an "unauthorized" site. In
these scenarios, a reasonably prudent user would not mistake the site as
the plaintiffs official Web site."' Weblogs are analogous to consumer
opinion Web sites in that webloggers are often relaying personal views
and opinions about the topic of their choice, whether it is critiquing the
newest movie, discussing anti-terrorism policy, or blasting multinational
corporations' accounting practices. A reasonably prudent visitor to a
106. Id. (both parties already offered competing products and services to the entertainment industry); Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (plaintiff did not intend to
operate an anti-Bally Web site or offer web page design services and defendant did not plan
to open a health club business); Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (neither party
anticipated entering the other's market).
107. Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
108. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1329
(8th Cir. 1984)).
109. Planned Parenthood,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *27.
110. Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
111. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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weblog is unlikely to mistake the source or sponsorship of the products or
services addressed since the content of the weblog will serve to convey
the personal opinion nature of the subject matter discussed.
f

Defendant's Good Faith in Adopting Its Own Mark

This element examines whether or not the defendant intended to
confuse consumers when it selected its own mark. Similar to consumer
opinion Web sites, webloggers generally do not intend to mislead consumers into thinking that the trademark owners sponsor the weblogs.
The information contained in weblogs will usually inform consumers
that no association is intended with the plaintiff. However, this element
may benefit the plaintiff if the defendant adopts its mark knowing that it
is someone else's trademark or with intent to capitalize on the reputation
of the plaintiff by attracting customers to the defendant's own products
1 12
or services.
Bad faith may be inferred if no plausible reasons are provided for
adopting another's trademark where the trademark owner is a known
competitor of the accused infringer at the time the mark was adopted. 113
A defendant who selects the plaintiffs mark knowing that some Internet
users looking for the plaintiffs Web site will be diverted to his own site is
also acting in bad faith. 1 14 While it is not a specific element of trademark infringement, intent only goes to the issue of the good or bad faith
of the defendant in selecting the mark and whether it affects the likelihood that consumers will be confused by the defendant's use of the
5
mark.11
Conversely, good faith is evidenced if the use of another's trademark
fairly and accurately describes defendant's own products or services,
does not confuse or mislead the public, does not imply sponsorship or
affiliation with the plaintiff, and the defendant further takes measures
against the unauthorized use of the mark. 1 16 Defendants in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. acted in good faith because there was no evidence that they intended to confuse users of their
Web portals or capitalize on plaintiffs reputation, since defendants
"charge their advertisers according to the number of times a banner advertisement is displayed to users, regardless of how many users 'click' on
the banner ad." 117 Similarly, the Bally Court determined that defendant's purpose in adopting the mark was only to "publish critical com112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1059.
Washington Speakers Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *30.
Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1059.
Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1082, 1086.
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. [and] he cannot do this without making

Quality of the Defendant's Product or Services

This factor considers whether the defendant's use of the mark will
adversely affect the plaintiffs business. This will be relevant where defendant's goods or services are unsavory or are of inferior quality such
that the consuming public will associate negative characteristics with
the plaintiff. It will also be pertinent where divergent or opposing views
and messages are publicized. For example, in Planned ParenthoodFederation of America, Inc. v.Bucci, the Court noted that since the parties
offered very different services and communicated opposing messages,
"any ensuing confusion resulting from defendant's use of plaintiffs mark
as his domain name and home page address is likely to be destructive to
the image that plaintiff, the senior user of the mark, has established."" 19
Due to the personal nature of most weblogs, this element is unlikely
to have any impact because weblog content is usually viewed as the author's personal opinions and expressions. However, where the purpose of
a weblog is to engage in commercial activity or solicit funds and donations, the weblogger should be wary of the possible adverse impact upon
the plaintiffs reputation that may arise from the use of a mark that is
identical or similar to the plaintiffs trademark. For instance, weblogs
may become an alternative or supplemental vehicle for marketing and
moneymaking schemes. Depending upon the product or service being
promoted, advertisers may look to weblogs to target consumers by specific age, gender, interests, opinions, demographics, etc., to optimize
their selling opportunities.
Since blogs and bloggers may be viewed as pioneers and innovators,
advertisers may want to tap into this buying power to market products
or services that strive to fit the same hip and trend-setting image. For
example, a recent marketing campaign by Dr. Pepper and Seven Up
identified and recruited some of the most popular bloggers to test a new
drink that is targeted for teenagers and young adults who are avid bloggers or followers. 120 While no formal fees were paid for their service, the
bloggers were offered merchandise for their participation and cooperation and were left to decide whether to discuss the drink in their
weblogs. 12 1 This scenario may influence a court to find that sufficient
commercial activity exists, whether direct, as in monetary compensation,
118. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
119. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31.
120. Blogging Goes Mainstream, CNN News <http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECHIinternet
03/10bloggers.ap> (Mar. 10, 2003).
121. Id.
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or indirect, as in non-monetary rewards of fame and notoriety of the
weblogs.
h.

Sophisticationof the Buyers

Here, the focus is on the degree of care a "reasonably prudent consumer" is likely to exercise when searching for and arriving at Web
sites. 122 When products or services are offered to sophisticated buyers or
when the purchase price is high, a reasonably prudent purchaser is more
discerning and not as easily confused. 12 3 But, where the products or services are inexpensive or if the purchaser is less discerning, the likelihood
of consumer confusion is higher.' 2 4 In some cases, consumers with frequent Internet access are perceived to be more sophisticated.' 25 This
element is likely to benefit weblog defendants as most Internet users are
well accustomed to the fact that they may have to sort through lots of
irrelevant information before finding what they are looking for. A visitor
to a weblog is unlikely to assume a relationship by the mere fact that the
weblog contains someone else's trademark.
The average Internet user may want to access everything regarding
a particular trademark or product or service, whether positive or negative, but may not be able to retrieve all the information unless the trademark is included in weblogs. Confusion is less likely where precautions
are taken to disassociate the weblog from the trademark. The defendant
in Bally took measures to inform consumers that his Web site was not
affiliated with the plaintiff. he did not use Bally's domain name, the
mark was used for criticism and commentary, the site stated it was "unauthorized," and the site did not add to the large volume of information
an average Internet user already sifts through. 126 Completely preventing the defendant from using the Bally name blocks his message from
being communicated to the public.1 27 However, as evidenced in Planned
Parenthood,even sophisticated Internet users can be confused upon arriving at the defendant's Web site and seeing the welcoming text: "Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!" and some users
are likely to remain confused even after reading the information in the
128
defendant's Web site.
Based upon the Polaroid Factors, it can be gleaned that there is no
sure fire way to predict which factors will benefit which party. What is
apparent is that the analysis is extremely fact-intensive and certain
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1059.
Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31.
Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
Id.
Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31.
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characteristics, such as the content of the weblog, the intent of the author and creator, the commercial or non-commercial purpose of the
weblog, and the competing or non-competing nature of the products or
services addressed in the weblog and the trademark, will be particularly
examined. The ultimate query will be whether using a trademark in a
weblog is likely to cause consumer confusion or create initial interest
confusion. Unfortunately, the average weblogger may not readily know
that a particular use of someone's trademark amounts to a likelihood of
confusion. Since creators and authors of weblogs are directly responsible
for posting content on their weblogs, they are likely to be held to a higher
standard of care. The greater the advantage that is generated from using another's trademark, the more likely a court will find against the
weblogger.
D.

UNFAIR COMPETITION

Weblog activity is also subject to claims of unfair competition for the
unpermitted use of another's trademark. The Lanham Act protects
trademarks against unfair competition and prohibits use in commerce of
any term or false designation of origin that "is likely to cause confusion
• ..as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person." 129 The statute exempts cases where the mark is used in comparative commercial
advertising, non-commercial use, and news reporting and
commentary.130
The Act protects trademarks regardless of federal registration, but
the plaintiff must prove: (a) the existence of a valid trademark and (b)
that defendant's use is likely to cause confusion as to source or sponsorship of the products or services. 13 1 The likelihood of confusion test for
determining unfair competition is the same as that for establishing
trademark infringement and the same "Polariod Factors" apply. 13 2 Not
all factors will be relevant or receive equal weight in all cases and the
court will apply those factors that seem most appropriate. 133 The court
may even find that the Polariod Factors do not provide much guidance
where the defendant does not sell a competing product or service such as
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
130. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
131. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); The N.Y. State Socy. of
Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
132. N.Y. State Socy. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 340; Prime Publishers, Inc. v. Am. Republic, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 266, 283 (D. Conn. 2001).
133. Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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in a consumer opinion Web site or a weblog. 13 4
The existence of a valid trademark requires the same analysis as
that for a protectable mark under trademark infringement. The brunt of
unfair competition analysis is determining the likelihood of confusion.
For the Lanham Act to apply to an unfair competition claim, the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark must be in connection with commercial
activities. 135 Additionally, the only uses that are actionable are those
likely to cause consumer confusion as to "origin, sponsorship, or approval
of the defendant's goods, services, or commercial activities.' 3 6
The defendant's conduct was held to be "use in commerce" where: (a)
his Web site interferes with the plaintiffs ability to provide its services
throughout the United States, (b) he uses interstate telephone and cable
lines to establish presence on the Internet, (c) while the defendant does
not solicit funds from Internet users, his site does advertise the sale of a
book written by another, (d) his use of the mark helps him promote his
own informational services in direct competition with the plaintiffs, and
(e) his Web site prevents some people from reaching the plaintiffs Web
site because "[p]rospective users of plaintiffs services who mistakenly
access defendant's [W] eb site may fail to continue to search for plaintiffs
own home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that plaintiffs
home page does not exist.' 37 While no actual sales or advertising activity is required, it is sufficient that the defendant's use of the trademark
interferes with potential customers of the plaintiff from accessing the
plaintiffs Web site such that they abandon their search for the plaintiffs

site. 138
There is little likelihood of confusion where a consumer opinion Web
site comments on and criticizes a plaintiffs services because, once the
site is accessed, it takes little time to realize that it is not the official site
of the plaintiff.13 9 For instance, there is no mistaking the message of a
134. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
135. Id. at 318.
136. Id.
137. PlannedParenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15.
138. People For The Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365-66
(4th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff was an animal rights organization and defendant a former Internet executive. Defendant registered the domain name "peta.org" for his Web site that
was a "resource for those who enjoy eating meat, wearing fur and leather, hunting, and the
fruits of scientific research." His site also contained a link to plaintiffs official site.
139. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319. Plaintiffs Marianne Bihari and Bihari Interiors,
Inc. provided interior design services in New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, California, and Florida. Defendant was a dissatisfied client who created the Web sites
"bihari.com," "bihariinteriors.com," "designscam.com," and "manhattaninteriorsdesign.com," all of which were devoted to criticizing the plaintiffs business. All of the Web
sites contained "Bihari Interiors" metatags that ensured that these sites would be retrieved
by any user searching for the plaintiffs' site using plaintiffs' name.
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Web site that has the domain name "Bally Sucks" and that contains negative remarks about the Bally company. Similarly, registering a longtime nickname, "Strick," as a domain name for a personal Web site does
not result in unfair competition with the plaintiffs business, "Strick
Corp.," where the parties are not in the same line of work and the defendant's adoption of the name is not an intent to deceive the plaintiffs
14 0
customers.
Where no sales activity is involved and no actual consumer confusion is evidenced, as is the case for most weblogs, a claim of "initial interest confusion" may be raised by trademark owners. The crux of initial
interest confusion is that "potential customers of one [Web site] will be
diverted and distracted to a competing [Web site]," resulting in harm to
the trademark owner due to the fact that "the potential customer believes that the competing Web site is associated with the Web site the
customer was originally searching for and will not resume searching for
14 1
the original Web site."
Providing links to and from a weblog is one area where this may
come into play. Linking to Web sites that engage in commercial activities constitutes use of plaintiffs trademark in connection with the sale of
products or services. 14 2 A court may find that, while no direct commercial use is made of a trademark, the mere act of providing links to other
Web sites that promote commercial activity may be sufficient "commercial use" of the mark. 14 3 The defendant's site may be viewed as "a conduit, steering potential customers away from [plaintiff] and toward its
competitors, thereby transforming [defendant's] otherwise protected
speech into a commercial use."1 4 4 This reading of the law is particularly
unfavorable to webloggers because linking is the hallmark of weblogs.
Inserting links to other weblogs or Web sites that sell products or services or solicit funds or donations may expose the linked-from weblog to
liability if consumers mistakenly believe an affiliation between the
weblog and the trademark.
Using the plaintiffs trademark as a domain name and as metatags
is another area that creates initial interest confusion and increases the
likelihood of confusion constituting false designation of origin, thus
140. Strick, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77. Plaintiff was a manufacturer of transportation
goods and operated several Web sites including "strickcorp.com" and "strickparts.com."
Defendant was an independent computer consultant who was commonly known as "Strick,"
a nickname he had used since childhood, and operated a Web site "strick.com" to communicate with his clients.
141. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
142. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366.
143. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
144. Id.
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amounting to unfair competition. 145 Including a disclaimer is insufficient where use of a mark causes initial interest confusion for visitors
who expect to arrive at the plaintiffs Web site but, instead, find themselves on the defendant's Web site. 14 6 Alternatively, there is little likelihood of initial interest confusion where the defendant's Web sites do not
divert people looking for information about the plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs do not operate a Web site of their own, the defendant's Web
sites actually provide information about the plaintiffs' business, and the
defendant's Web sites' domain names and content make it clear that the
14 7
sites are not sponsored by the plaintiffs.
An emerging and problematic weblog setting is where a corporation
operates a weblog that is open to its employees and consumers and to
which the employees can post content. There may be instances in which
the employees, while being ignorant of trademark law, reference trademarks belonging to other businesses. Is such use "likely to cause confusion" among consumers who visit the corporation's weblog, see another
company's trademark and mistakenly conclude that the two businesses
are affiliated? Could such use satisfy the "use in commerce" requirement? Would the corporation be liable for this erroneous assumption? It
is difficult to predict the result but the total look and feel of the weblog
and the context in which the trademark is used within the weblog will
control the outcome.
Unfair competition will focus on whether a weblog that incorporates
an unauthorized trademark engages in commercial activity such that it
causes a likelihood of confusion or creates initial interest confusion
among Internet consumers. The extent of interference with the trademark owner's business and reputation will also be a critical factor in de145. N.Y. State Socy. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 342. Plaintiffwas
a non-profit organization that offered various services in connection with the accountancy
profession, including employment opportunities, and maintained a Web site under the domain name "nysscpa.org." Defendant was a for-profit employment agency that placed professionals, including accountants, in temporary or permanent jobs and offered its services
on the Internet at "nysscpa.com." Both parties covered the New York state region in their
marketing and advertising campaigns. Plaintiff owned the trademark "NYSSCPA" and
registered the domain name "nysscpa.org" for its Web site. Defendant subsequently used
"nysscpa.com" as a domain name and "NYSSCPA" as a metatag in its own Web site which
included a link to the plaintiffs site. A "metatag" is a special HTML tag that provides
information about a web page such as who created it, how often it is updated, description of
the page, and any keywords used to represent the content of the page. "meta tag"
Webopedia,
Online Dictionary for Computer and Internet Terms <http://
www.webopedia.com> (accessed Mar. 14, 2002). Metatags are not visible on the web page
accessed and are often used by search engines for indexing purposes. Id.
146. N.Y. State Socy. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 342. Defendant's
Web site included a disclaimer stating that the defendant was not affiliated with the New
York Society of CPAs.
147. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
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ciding weblog accountability. As weblogs expand to include activities
that may qualify as "commercial" under unfair competition laws, the
risks of liability increase unless precautions are taken to assure against
confusion.

E.

DILUTION

Dilution is another theory that may be brought against weblogs.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act provides a cause of action for dilution of registered and unregistered trademarks.148 The owner of a trademark may sue another for unauthorized use of the mark upon proof that:
"(1) his mark is famous; (2) Defendant's use of the mark is commercial
use in commerce; (3) Defendant's use of the mark began after it became
famous; and (4) Defendant's use dilutes the mark's distinctive quality by
lessening the capacity of Plaintiffs mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services."1 49 The goal of this statute is "to prohibit the unauthorized use of another's trademark in order to market incompatible prod150
ucts or services."
a.

Famous Trademark

The initial requirement is that the trademark be distinctive and famous before dilution can be claimed. 15 1 The Lanham Act lists factors for
determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous.' 5 2 Where the
plaintiff can prove that the mark is distinctive and famous, this factor is
not an issue, but where the mark is deemed distinctive but not famous,
153
the dilution claim will not stand.
148. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
149. Strick, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
150. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
152. Section 1125 (c)(1) lists the following factors in deciding whether a mark is distinctive and famous:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade
used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1995, or on the principal register.
Id.
153. Prime Publishers,160 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (noting that the mark "Voices" was not
famous); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the marks "Avery" and "Dennison" were distinctive but not famous).
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Commercial Use

Another criteria is that the trademark be used in commerce by the
defendant.' 5 4 If a mark is used commercially to promote a competing
product or service or to somehow capitalize on the mark, a finding of
infringement is likely. Courts have interpreted "in commerce" to mean
not only doing business in or soliciting customers from multiple states,
but also doing business in a single state but with customers from multiple states. 155 A home page on an Internet Web site, which is accessible
to the general public, qualifies as use in commerce. 156 The "in commerce" standard is also met when defendant's interstate or intrastate
activities over the Internet affect plaintiffs services and where interstate
communication lines (telephone, cable) are used to access defendant's
Web site. 15 7 Commercial activity is also evidenced when a trademark is
used in domain names and metatags to lure customers to defendant's
Web site and when the defendant offers to sell the domain name to the
plaintiff.158
Where the use of a trademark is not commercial and is not for the
purpose of financial gain, a court may still find dilution, depending upon
the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of the mark. Some
courts have determined that fund-raising activities fall within "commercial use." 15 9 Commercial use is also found where a defendant promotes
the sale of a book, solicits funds for non-profit political activities, and
intends to harm plaintiff's business activities by diverting visitors to the
defendant's Web site. 160 Furthermore, even if a defendant does not solicit funds from visitors to his Web site, the inclusion of a hypertext link
to another Web site that is commercial in nature because it solicits donations may constitute commercial use of the trademark. 16 1 Additionally,
a defendant's intentional use of a Web site to disparage the plaintiffs
business and prevent visitors from learning about the plaintiff can cause
commercial harm because the plaintiff is deprived of the opportunity to
162
exploit the trademark to its own advantage.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
155. David Yan, Virtual Reality: Can We Ride Trademark Law to Surf Cyberspace, 10

Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 773, 841 n. 510 (2000).
156. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at 11.
157. Id.
158. N.Y. State Socy. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
159. PlannedParenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19; Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993

F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998). In Jews for Jesus, plaintiff was a nonprofit international
outreach ministry that teaches that Jesus is the messiah of Israel and savior of the world.
Defendant was a member of The Outreach Judaism Organization and created a Web site
"www.jewsforjesus.org" that espoused views contrary to those of Jews for Jesus.
160. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *16.
161. Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308.
162. Id.
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These results show that if a weblog is affiliated with an organization
that engages in fundraising activities, it may be held liable for the unauthorized use of a trademark. Moreover, using a trademark without permission in a non-commercial or not-for-profit weblog that posts links to
another for-profit Web site may constitute sufficient commercial use.
The implications of these decisions are significant for weblogs because,
like consumer opinion Web sites, they communicate the author's personal viewpoints and those viewpoints may influence consumer opinion
about the trademark's goodwill and reputation. 163 In addition, consideration must be given to the possibility that bloggers may achieve fame
and notoriety through their weblogs that may lead to paid speaking or
publishing engagements. Would these benefits, fame and fees, qualify as
"commercial use" for purposes of determining liability? Would testing or
critiquing products or services for advertisers and marketers who compensate bloggers, either monetarily or non-monetarily, be sufficient commercial activity?
Weblogs may find some protection in a line of cases holding that a
defendant's use of a trademark is not for commercial purposes nor for the
mark's trademark value where the mark is not used to sell products or
services or solicit funds. In Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises, the defendants' use of the "FORD" trademark was deemed not commercial because they neither used the mark to sell goods or services nor solicited
any donations. 164 Similarly, the Bally defendant was found to have not
used the trademark for commercial gain because he was neither selling
products or services nor involved in fundraising, and he operated several
Web sites, including the "Bally sucks" site, to exhibit his skills as a web

designer. 165
In the context of Cyberspace, the "mere use of another's name on the
Internet, however, is not per se commercial use."1 6 6 The Ninth Circuit in
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, held that the trademarks were not
used for commercial purposes or for their trademark value because evidence showed that the defendants only registered common surnames as
domain names, including "Avery" and "Dennison," that were then incorporated into vanity e-mail addresses and licensed to interested Internet

163. Rochat, supra n. 53, at 614.
164. Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enter., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663 (E.D. Mich, S.D. 2001).
Plaintiff was a corporation that operated a company Web site "ford.com." Defendants were
the registered owners of the domain name "fuckgeneralmotors.com." An Internet user conducting a search using the defendants' domain name was automatically linked to the plaintiffs site instead of remaining on the defendants' site.
165. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
166. Id. at 1163, 1166.
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users.' 67 These cases are particularly favorable to weblogs because they
offer the flexibility to incorporate trademarks into weblogs for discussion, commentary, or even commercial activity, as long as there is no
consumer confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship with the trademark.
c.

Trademark Was Famous Before Defendant Used It

This factor examines whether the trademark at issue became famous before the defendant's use of it. Evidence of federal registration of
the mark, the extent and duration of the use of the mark in marketing
and advertising, and the geographic boundaries of the use of the mark in
the real world as well as on the Internet all go to the issue of plaintiffs
trademark being famous. 168 Proof that the mark had achieved fame
before the defendant started using the same or similar mark supports
plaintiffs claim of dilution. This factor is easily satisfied and usually
favors the plaintiff by showing the dates and events on which the parties
started using their respective trademarks.
d.

Dilution of the Trademark's Distinctive Quality

The final element is whether the defendant's use of the trademark
causes dilution by lessening the ability of the mark to identify and distinguish between the parties' products or services. Dilution commonly
arises through blurring or tarnishment. Blurring happens when "defendant uses the plaintiffs trademark to identify the defendant's goods or
services, raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve
as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs services."' 69 Furthermore, the defendant's use of the mark "whittl [es] away the selling power and value of
a trademark" and prevents the consumer from immediately associating
the mark exclusively with the plaintiffs products or services. Instead,
the consumer thinks of both the plaintiff and the defendant upon seeing
the mark. 1 70 For example, blurring is found when potential customers of
the plaintiffs services find themselves on the defendant's Web site instead of the plaintiffs where both the defendant and the plaintiff provide
i
similar services in largely the same geographic area. 71
167. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 880. Plaintiff sold office products and industrial fasteners and owned the registered trademarks "Avery" and "Dennison." Defendant was president of a company that licensed vanity e-mail addresses to Internet users for a fee.
Defendant had registered thousands of domain names most of which were common
surnames.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
169. N.Y State Socy. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
170. Galbraith, supra n. 65, at 864 (citing Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 306).
171. N.Y State Socy. of CertifiedPub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 345. Both parties
maintained Web sites with similar domain names (plaintiffs site "nysscpa.org" and defen-
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Tarnishment occurs when "plaintiffs trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory
context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner's product."1 7 2 Adverse effects to the reputation and value of the trademark
may arise due to consumers associating the low quality of the defendant's products with those of the plaintiffs. 173 Tarnishment is proven
where the defendant's use of a trademark implies a relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff. Where a not-for-profit plaintiff and a
for-profit defendant provide similar services in a similar area of commerce and operate Web sites with similar domain names, tarnishment is
found because a visitor to the defendant's Web site may mistakenly infer
an affiliation between the parties and potentially associate negative
174
qualities of the defendant's business with those of the plaintiffs.
A claim of tarnishment will fail if an unofficial Web site devoted to
consumer commentary about a plaintiffs business practices must necessarily use a trademark to identify the products or services being criticized and where there is no evidence that defendant's Web site has
linked to any unsavory sites so as to tarnish the goodwill of plaintiffs
business. 175 Similarly, a reasonably prudent Internet user is unlikely to
believe sponsorship or affiliation between an unauthorized Web site
which links to another site that does not reference the trademark at
all.176

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not entitle trademark
owners to prohibit links to Web sites that contain content or have do77
main names that the trademark owner does not like.'
The essence of the Internet is that sites are connected to facilitate access to information. Including linked sites as grounds for finding commercial use or dilution would extend the statute far beyond its intended
purpose of protecting trademark owners from uses that have the effect
of 'lessening ...the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distin78
guish goods or services."
Even where defendants only use a trademark as metatags, which
creates a hyperlink to plaintiffs own official Web site, such use does not
interfere with plaintiffs ability to capitalize on its trademark.379 These
dant's site "nysscpa.com") to assist accountants in obtaining employment in and around the
New York area.
172. Id. at 346.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68.
176. Id. at 1168.
177. Ford Motor, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
178. Id.
179. Ford Motor, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 664. Defendants' domain name "fuckgeneralmotors.com" did not entail any use of plaintiffs trademark "Ford" and defendants only
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sentiments are particularly encouraging for weblogs since they commonly use links to guide readers to various sources within the weblog
communities and on the Internet generally.

F. DEFENSES
Trademarks are property rights in words, terms, or symbols that are
used to identify products or services.1 8 0 Trademark law, however, does
not permit owners of these property rights to monopolize the marks and
completely prohibit their use by anyone else.' 8 1 So long as there is no
likelihood of confusion by the consuming public about the source of goods
or services, the Lanham Act does not prevent others from using the
trademarks to accurately describe characteristics of their own products
18 2
or services.
The law exempts from trademark infringement liability certain uses
of marks, such as fair use, non-commercial use, and use for news reporting and commentary, so as to allow for the free flow of ideas and expression.1 8 3 Weblogs greatly benefit from these defenses, given that most
engage in sharing opinions, news commentary, and non-commercial activity. However, caution must be exercised where weblogs incorporate or
reference trademarks that cause weblog visitors to misconstrue the purpose, identity, or content of the weblog such that they form inaccurate
assumptions about the affiliation of the trademarks with creators, owners, or hosts of weblogs. Moreover, as weblogs venture into territory
from which fame, fortune or some other benefit is derived, the unauthorized use of trademarks may be viewed as "commercial use" or "use in
commerce," thereby making it much more difficult to establish a defense.
1.

Fair Use

The fair use defense is based upon "the concept that a trademark
registrant or holder cannot 'appropriate a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their good." 18 4 The Lanham Act provides that the use of a
trademark is exempt from liability if the mark is "used fairly and in good
faith only to describe the goods or services." 185 Furthermore, no liability
attaches for "[flair use of a famous mark by another person in comparaused the mark in the programming code which caused the user to be linked to plaintiffs
official Web site "ford.com."
180. Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1081; Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
181. Id.; Id.
182. Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1065.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
184. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Publg.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1991)).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
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tive commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods
or services of the owner of the famous mark."1 8 6 The fair use defense
applies in the real world as well as in Cyberspace. 187 The defendant has
the burden of proving that (1) the mark is not used as a trademark, (2)
the mark is used fairly and in good faith, and (3) the mark is only used to
18 8
describe the defendant's products or services.
a.

Non-Trademark Use

The use of a trademark for its non-trademark or non-commercial
value is "a different type of fair use that 'lies outside the strictures of
trademark law' because it 'does not implicate the source-identification
function that is the purpose of trademark' and because it 'does not imply
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder."'" 8 9 This use is
recognized as "'nominative use' of a mark - where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service."' 90
Three elements must be met to satisfy a nominative use defense: "(1) the
product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark or marks may be
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3)
the defendant must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." 19 1 No
1 92
analysis of likelihood of confusion is required.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, defendant's use was deemed
nominative when she used the plaintiffs marks "Playboy" and "Playmate" in various sections of her Web site.193 Defendant is a former recipient of the "Playmate of the Month" and "Playmate of the Year"
awards and used these titles to refer to herself because they are "part of
her identity and add value and 'prestige' to her name" and are recognized
by the public. 1 94 Furthermore, no substitute words or terms for the
marks were available, the defendant only used as much of the marks as
was necessary to identify herself to consumers, the defendant's Web site
content did not imply endorsement by the plaintiff and specifically disclaimed any affiliation, and the site even contained links to information
195
about the litigation between the parties.
186. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A).
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 321; Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1065.
Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
Id. at 1089-90 (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308).
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1090.
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Good Faith

In order to prove "good faith" use of a mark, the defendant must
show that in adopting the mark, the defendant did not intend to capitalize on the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff and mislead consumers
into believing that the defendant and the plaintiff were associated with
one another. 19 6 Actual knowledge of prior use and ownership of the
trademark by another or being denied consent to use the mark does not
97
imply bad faith on the part of the defendant in adopting the mark.1
Evidence that precautions have been taken to ensure against unauthorized use supports a finding that defendant acted in good faith. 198 The
defendant in Welles was found to have met these standards, particularly
since no other words or terms accurately described her titles and profession. 199 The Bihari Court acknowledged that inserting trademarks in
metatags constituted fair use because metatags were merely a "cataloging system" that enabled a defendant to index the Web site content that
20 0
could later be efficiently retrieved by search engines.
c.

Descriptive Use

This element is satisfied where the "mark is used in an index or catalog, or to describe the defendant's connection to the business claiming
trademark protection." 20 1 Sometimes, there are no viable alternatives
and using the trademark is the only way to describe the defendant's own
products or services. For example, the Welles court determined that,
given that there were no substitute words or terms to describe the defendant's titles, "Playmate of the Month" and "Playmate of the Year," and
since the titles themselves described the products being sold by the defendant, the marks fairly and accurately described the defendant's goods
2 02
and services and constituted fair use.
The Lanham Act permits descriptive use of a trademark to identify
products or services of a competitor. Descriptive use of marks can be
made in advertisements that truthfully compare the products of the defendant with those of the trademark owner, or where the trademark has
meaning in the English language and is used in an advertisement as a
196. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
197. Id.; Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
198. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Examples of security measures include: removing
or changing content upon request of trademark owner, adding disclaimers denying association, linking to plaintiffs site, different font, size and color, not incorporating trademark in
domain name, and not using plaintiffs logos or symbols.
199. Id.
200. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
201. Id. at 322.
202. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
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dictionary word or term. 20 3 For instance, the court in Brookfield Communications stated that West Coast could use "MovieBuff' in advertising
"Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for
FREE?," or use "Movie Buff' to refer to a "motion picture enthusiast" or
movie devotee. 20 4 "A trademark holder may not bar all use on the Internet of words in the English language."20 5
The fair use defense will fail where a defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark is for the specific purpose of luring customers to the defendant's own Web site and describing the defendant's own products
rather than referencing those of the plaintiffs. 20 6 While not mandated
by the Lanham Act, courts will consider evidence of likelihood of confusion to overcome a defense of fair use because "a fair use cannot simultaneously be a confusing use" if it misleads consumers about the source or
sponsorship of products or services. 20 7 Here, again, the Polariod Factors
20 8
are applied to ascertain the likelihood of confusion.
In the case of consumer opinion Web sites, fair use is found where
the defendant's use of a trademark in metatags of a Web site fairly identifies information about the plaintiffs business and reference to the
mark is the only way for the defendant to communicate his opinions to
Internet users. 2 09 Prohibiting trademark use in metatags would "effectively foreclose all discourse and comment" that might otherwise be pro2 10
tected under the Lanham Act and the Constitution.
The primary purpose of trademark law, to prevent the likelihood of
confusion in the minds of the consuming public, cannot be sidestepped
with a fair use defense. Weblogs must abide by this rule if they are to be
protected under this exemption and most may be able to satisfy the fair
use criteria quite easily. However, with advanced technology making it
simpler and easier to participate in Cyber activities, the potential for
other uses of weblogs is great. Entities with limited resources may turn
to weblogs to fulfill electronic commerce and other business needs.
Others may utilize weblogs to solicit resources to fund social, political, or
religious causes. Still others may have agendas that can better be carried out through weblogs. Whatever the use, the court will turn to the
traditional standards to establish whether a weblog has made fair use of
another's trademark.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1066.
Id.
Netscape Commun., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
Brookfield Commun., 174 F.3d at 1066.
Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
Id. at 1081.
Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
Id.
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Parody

Parody Web sites are created for the purpose of poking fun at specific products or services. 2 11 Parody is a "simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark
with the idealized image created by the mark's owner."2 12 It must "convey two simultaneous - and contradictory - messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody."2 1 3
Although there is a slight risk of initial consumer confusion, an effective
parody will diminish this risk by presenting just enough of the original
2 14
mark to make its point.
Parody standards are not met where a defendant uses the plaintiff's
trademark as a domain name that does not simultaneously convey the
dual messages of the parody. There is likelihood of confusion when the
defendant incorporates the plaintiffs trademark "PETA" in the domain
name of his own Web site "peta.org" because it is not until after a viewer
has used the trademark to enter the Web site and read the content that
they realize that the site is not the plaintiffs official Web site. 215 Viewing the "domain name alone, there is no suggestion of a parody" and, by
itself, the "domain name does not convey the second, contradictory message needed to establish a parody - a message that the domain is not
2 16
related to PETA, but that it is a parody of PETA."
A parody claim also fails where neither the domain name of the Web
site nor the welcoming text on the home page simultaneously convey the
dual messages necessary to suggest a parody or inform the viewer that
they have not accessed the plaintiffs Web site. 2 17 Appropriating the
plaintiffs trademark "Planned Parenthood" as a domain name for defendant's own Web site "plannedparenthood.com" and as an initial greeting
"Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page!" misleads viewers into
thinking they have reached the plaintiffs site. 2 18 The dual messages of
the parody are not readily apparent thus contributing to consumer confusion about the ownership of the trademark.
Weblogs that make unauthorized use of trademarks may also benefit from this defense, as long as the dual messages of the parody are readily apparent to the viewing public. When selecting the domain name of
211. Maynard, supra n. 56, at 1347.
212. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366 (citing L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Publishers,Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987)).
213. Id. (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 366-67.
216. Id. at 366.
217. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 at 33-34.
218. Id. at 34.

476

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXI

the weblog and its content, webloggers must take care so as not to mislead or confuse viewers. Viewers must immediately understand
whatever parody, humor, or satire the weblog is aiming to convey. The
more easily viewers are able to distinguish the weblog from the trademark, the more likely the court will uphold a parody defense.
G.

CONCLUSION

Trademark law must balance the rights of intellectual property owners with the public's right to access and use information in non-infringing ways. It must take into account the rapid developments in Internet
technology, the conflict between commercial and non-commercial use,
the concurrent use of the same trademark on related and unrelated products and services, and the use of the mark in the same or different geographic regions. The potential for trademark infringement liability may
have a chilling effect on the growth of the Internet and may deter people
2 19
from creating weblogs or force them to limit the content of weblogs.
As discussed above, there are many ways in which trademarks can
be incorporated into weblogs. From the domain name of the weblog, to
its content and messages, to the banners that advertise products or services, and to the links that navigate weblog visitors to other blogs or Web
sites, trademarks are a tempting means of luring Internet users to certain weblogs. Fortunately, most current weblog activities do not rise to
this level of trademark use and much of the conduct may even be protected by the legal exemptions. However, as weblogs expand into other
areas and encompass commercial activity in particular, the issue becomes cloudy as to what acts the defenses will continue to protect and
what will amount to trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution. Cyberspace is becoming a more and more pervasive part of personal and professional life and trademark owners are tightening
monitoring and enforcement efforts. Legal interpretations of "commercial use," "likelihood of confusion" and "fair use" may evolve to better
protect trademarks and webloggers must stay abreast of the law in order
to protect their own interests.
IV.

COPYRIGHT

A.

INTRODUCTION

Copyright is another major concern with respect to weblog content.
The Internet is the modern version of the printing press in that it has
220
It
revolutionized the cost and speed of disseminating information.
219. Maynard, supra n. 56, at 1343.
220. Matthew Kane, Copyright and the Internet: The Balance Between Protection and
Encouragement,22 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 183, 185 (2000).
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has increased not only accessibility to copyrighted works, but also the
potential for copyright infringement. 22 1 Copyright law is aimed at protecting authors' creative works while preserving the public's right to
freely access information. These dual goals are severely tested by the
ease with which copyrighted material is available for unfettered and unlimited copying on the Internet. This has raised concerns about whether
traditional copyright laws can adequately protect intellectual property
rights in Cyberspace, while allowing the public to maximize their use
and enjoyment of the Internet.
Weblogs are another medium of expression on the Internet and are
subject to the provisions of copyright law. They may incorporate text,
images, sounds, and links to convey the authors' thoughts, ideas, and
opinions about professional, social, political, and religious issues. In
composing blogs, webloggers must be careful to avoid unauthorized references to materials that are protected by copyright. Copying a photograph, painting, story, music, or borrowing a protected article or poem to
address an issue or make a point may implicate copyright infringement.
Failure to obtain prior approval of the copyright owners may subject
weblogs to liability, unless an exemption applies under the law.
There is no legal precedent specifically addressing copyright infringement liability of weblogs. It is unclear whether courts will apply
traditional legal standards or devise new tests when addressing weblogs.
Therefore, it will be helpful to examine other Internet cases, such as
those involving Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), Bulletin Board Service ("BBS") operators, Web site owners, and linking, to decipher the criteria and standards the courts are likely to apply to weblogs.
B.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

The United States Constitution is the original basis for copyright
protection and specifically authorizes Congress to protect authors'
works. 2 22 The idea was that if you protected authors' works, then you
encouraged future creative endeavors that would contribute to the intellectual advancement of society as a whole. The Copyright Act was enacted to identify the boundaries of copyright protection and
infringement. 2 23 The owner of a copyrighted work is granted specific ex221. Id. at 186.
222. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8(8). The Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ... " Id.
223. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
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clusive rights 2 24 and provided with remedies 2 25 for the unauthorized use
of protected materials. Copyright protection is awarded to any "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 226 So
long as "the work [is] independently created by the author" and "possesses a minimal degree of creativity," it will meet the originality requirement. 22 7 Pursuant to the advent of the Internet and digital
technology, several amendments to the Copyright Act have been made to
228
better preserve copyright protection in Cyberspace.
One such amendment, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") of 1998, was specifically enacted to address the growing coneither directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does Copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
Id.

224. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Copyright owner has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.

225. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503, 504, and 505 (2000). Remedies for copyright infringement
include injunctions, impounding and disposing of infringing articles, damages and profits,
and costs and attorney's fees.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
227. Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
228. These amendments to the Copyright Act are: (1) Audio Home RecordingAct of 1992

which added chapter 10 to facilitate regulation of digital audio recording devices, (2) Digital Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 which modified § 106 to provide a limited per-

formance right for sound recordings by digital audio transmission, and (3) No Electronic
Theft Act of 1997 which amended § 506 to criminalize certain willful infringements.
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cerns about making copyrighted material available on the Internet while
preserving the rights of copyright owners, and affording protection
against copyright infringement liability to parties who made access to
and use of the Internet possible while promoting the growth and efficiency of the Internet. 2 29 The DMCA "is designed to facilitate the robust
development and worldwide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education." 2 30 The important
changes brought by the DMCA that particularly affect weblogs and the
entities associated with weblogs are discussed in the following sections.
By way of background, case law preceding the DMCA is examined to
show how courts have struggled with similar issues then contrasted with
post-DMCA cases to suggest how courts are likely to analyze weblog
cases.
C.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Copyright infringement arises from the unauthorized use of one or
more of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. 23 1 The CopyrightAct states that "anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the
author."23 2 Neither knowledge nor intent is a required element. 233 Legal precedent recognizes the Internet as a vehicle for copyright infringement. 23 4 In Cyberspace, the rights commonly affected are the rights of
reproduction and distribution of a protected work, either in part or in
23 5
whole.
The Internet makes it simple and easy to transmit written text,
graphics, and sounds via telephone and cable wires from one computer to
another. "A single act of transmission or browsing on the Net can poten23 6
tially violate all of the exclusive rights listed in the Copyright Act."
For example, posting a favorite poem on a weblog implicates the rights of
reproduction (copying of the poem) and distribution (posting and making
available to the public). These rights may be violated every time the
poem is downloaded or forwarded to another computer, unless a defense
229. Lee Hollaar, Legal Protection Of Digital Information 166-67 (2002); DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C, §§ 512, 1201 (2000).
230. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Sen.
Rpt. 105-190, at 1 (105th Congress, 2d Session 1998)).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000).
232. Id.
233. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
234. Michaels v. Internet Ent. Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
235. Kane, supra n. 220, at 187.
236. Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with OverlappingCopyrights on the Internet, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 547, 549 (1997).
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excuses the infringing conduct. Copyright issues in weblogs may arise in
the text, graphics, pictures, music, sound, and links that comprise the
weblog content. Weblogs may contain any combination of these audio
and visual features to convey a message or enhance the visitors'
enjoyment.
1.

Types of Infringement

There are three types of infringement liability that may affect
webloggers: direct, contributory, and vicarious infringement. The Copyright Act specifically holds liable those who directly and actually cause
the infringement and courts have borrowed theories of contributory and
vicarious liability from other areas of the law to impose liability where it
237
would be fair to hold one responsible for the infringing acts of another.
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court recognized
contributory and vicarious liability as applicable theories in copyright
infringement lawsuits. 238 These causes of action require that there be
direct infringement by someone, which is often easy to prove in the Internet context, before another party can be held liable for supporting or
encouraging the direct infringer's activities. 2 3 9 This benefits copyright
owners because it expands the number of potentially liable parties to include not only individual users but also weblog owners, operators, hosts,
Internet access providers, and BBS operators.
a.

Direct Infringement

A claim of direct infringement requires the plaintiff to prove: (1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying by the defendant as evidenced by the defendant's access to the copyrighted work and the substantial similarity between the protected and infringing works. 240 The
Copyright Act defines a "copy" as a material object "in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 2 4 1 The Act states that a
"work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord ...is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
237. Fonovisa, Inc. v.Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
238. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
239. Lemley, supra n. 236, at 564.
240. Feist Publications,499 U.S. at 361; Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh,Inc.,
982 F. Supp. 503, 508 (N.D. Ohio 1997); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1165 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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more than transitory duration." 24 2 Neither intent to infringe nor knowledge of the infringing conduct is a required element of direct infringement. 2 43 Copyright registration is usually prima facie evidence of
ownership. 2 44 The major focus of a direct infringement analysis is on
whether the defendant copied the protected material.
b.

ContributoryInfringement

Where a user, whether an individual or a business, is found directly
liable for copyright infringement, Web site owners, ISPs, and BBS operators may also face potential liability for contributing to the infringing
conduct. 24 5 Contributory infringement "will be established where the
defendant, 'with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.' 2 46 In contrast with other theories that impose more of a strict liability, the emphasis here is on whether the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge that infringing conduct was occurring on their facilities and
that the defendant induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringement. Courts often analogize contributory infringement on the Internet with real-world cases. In one case, contributory liability was
imposed where the defendant received notice that copyrighted material
was illegally sold at swap meets organized and operated by them and the
defendant aided and contributed to the infringing conduct by providing
2 47
space, parking, utilities, plumbing, advertisement, and customers.
Applied in the Cyberspace context, for example, ISPs may be held accountable because they allow infringing works to pass through their systems and be available to the Internet public. They are an intermediary
between the subscribers and the Internet and are an easy target for liability because they are easier to identify and find than are individual
248
users.
c.

Vicarious Infringement

Web sites, ISPs, and BBS operators may also be accountable for copyright infringement on the theory of vicarious liability. To hold one re242. Id.
243. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1371.
244. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
245. Tsilas, supra n. 60, at 89.
246. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
247. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. Plaintiff owned copyrighted Latin/Hispanic music recordings while defendant operated swap meets where vendors sold various merchandise to
customers.
248. Lemley, supra n. 236, at 553.
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sponsible for the infringing conduct of a direct infringer, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant: "(1) has the right and ability to control
the infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the
infringement." 249 Knowledge is not a required element and facts and circumstances dictate whether sufficient "control" was exercised and "direct
financial benefit" derived. 250 Conduct amounting to organizing and promoting swap meets, patrolling the facilities, terminating vendors for any
reason, and controlling customers' access to the swap meets constituted
sufficient control over the direct infringers, customers, and vendors who
engaged in the unauthorized purchase and sale of copyrighted materials. 25 1 That a substantial direct financial benefit was derived from the
infringing activities was evidenced by "admission fees, concession stand
sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who
25 2
want to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices."
Financial benefit was also found where the infringing activity acts as a
25 3
"draw" for attracting customers.
Depending upon the facts of the case, weblogs may be exposed to any
or all of these theories of copyright infringement liability. Direct liability
may be found if the blogger is the one to actually initiate and post the
infringing content. The potential for contributory and vicarious liability
exists particularly if weblogs are designed to be interactive with weblog
visitors who are allowed to contribute to the weblog content. Contributory liability may be imposed where the weblogger knows that infringing
material is posted by weblog visitors and yet does nothing to stop the
infringement, for example, by deactivating the public's ability to add content to the weblog. Vicarious liability may be established if the weblogger fails to terminate the interactive features of the blog so that others
cannot post infringing content but fails to do so, and where the blog financially benefits from the infringing material itself such as through improved sales if the weblog markets or sponsors a product or service or
increased fees from banner advertisements due to the additional visitors
to the blog who are looking for the infringing content.
2.

Background

Computer and Internet technology have presented many challenges
to the enforcement of copyright law. Prior to the enactment of the
DMCA, there was much confusion as to what technical and mechanical
computer acts constituted copying, who caused those acts to occur, and
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Id.
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
Id.
Id,

2003]

ARE YOU CONTENT WITH THE CONTENT?

who should be held responsible if the copying was unauthorized. The
problem being that almost anyone in Cyberspace was bound to violate
one of the copyright rights without actively and consciously performing
actual acts to initiate the copying process. The cases below indicate how
courts have grappled with fitting modern technology within the bounds
of traditional copyright law.
a.

Direct Infringement

A literal interpretation of the Copyright Act was applied in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc. to hold the defendant liable for direct
infringement for the unauthorized use of the computer owner's licensed
operating system software when defendant's computer repair technician,
who was not authorized to use the software, merely turned on the computer that caused the software to be loaded into the computer's random
access memory ("RAM"). 254 A "copy" was generated when the computer
program was transferred from the storage device, such as the hard-drive
or disk, into RAM and was sufficiently "fixed" to satisfy the statutory
requirement. 255 Loading data from a storage device into RAM "constitutes copying because that data stays in RAM long enough for it to be
256
perceived."
Strict liability for direct infringement was also imposed on an ISP
for the unauthorized conduct of its subscribers, who actually performed
the infringing acts, where the service provider "supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work" and "[iit did not mat257
ter that [defendant] claims he did not make the copies itself."
Similarly, in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, the BBS operator was
directly responsible for the unauthorized copying of video games that
were uploaded on their bulletin board by unknown Internet users that
caused these protected works to be made available for uploading and
258
downloading by other users.
Other courts have required a more active role by ISPs that resulted
in direct infringement before finding liability. For instance, in Playboy
Enterprises,Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh,Inc., the court found the BBS accountable because it encouraged subscribers to upload files, it screened
those files for appropriateness and selected those files it deemed accept254. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
255. Id.
256. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
257. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (a BBS operator was liable because it enabled unauthorized copies of copyrighted photographs to be posted in its system).
258. Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 686. Plaintiff was a manufacturer and distributor of
computer video games that are copyright protected. Defendant operated an Internet bulletin board service that was used by users to upload and download unauthorized copies of
plaintiffs games.
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able, and it further made the selected files available to all users. 25 9
These acts "transformed Defendants from passive providers of a space in
which infringing activities happened to occur to active participants in
the process of copyright infringement." 260 Furthermore, the court in
Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Webbworld decided that a Web site operator

may be found to actively participate in and directly infringe upon the
plaintiffs (a) right to reproduce when it downloaded copyrighted images
from newsgroups and reproduced miniature versions onto its own servers, (b) right to distribute when it allowed users to download and print
copies of protected materials, and (c) right to display when it enabled
copyrighted images to be viewed by paying subscribers while online at
261
the defendant's Web site.
In contrast to these holdings, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc. held that an ISP was not directly

liable for copying where it "did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in copying plaintiffs' works other than by installing and
maintaining a system whereby software automatically forwards
messages received from subscribers onto the [defendant's storage device], and temporarily stores copies on its system." 26 2 As a provider of
Internet access, the defendant's actions were "necessary to having a
working system for transmitting [communication] to and from the Internet" and that "the mere fact that [defendant's] system incidentally
makes temporary copies of plaintiffs works does not mean [defendant]
has caused the copying." 2 63 The uploading by users of infringing works
into an ISP's storage system for retransmission to other computers does
not amount to the ISP itself copying or reproducing the protected material. 264 "[Alithough copyright is a strict liability statute, there should

still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party."26 5
259. Russ Hardenburgh,982 F. Supp. at 513. Plaintiff was the owner of copyrighted
adult photograph. Defendants operated a bulletin board service that contained files for
uploading and downloading by paying subscribers. As a way to increase its database, defendants offered extra downloading capacity in exchange for users uploading data onto the
defendants' network. Some of plaintiffs protected works were reproduced on the defendants' system without the plaintiffs permission.
260. Id.
261. Playboy Enter. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Texas 1997). Defendant
operated an adult Web site that contained copyrighted pictures that were downloaded by
defendant from various newsgroups, which are an Internet forum for the exchange of ideas
on specific topics of interest.
262. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368. Defendant Netcom was an ISP whose services ena-

bled its subscribers and users to gain Internet access. One subscriber, defendant Erlich,
posted messages that infringed plaintiffs copyrighted works.
263. Id. at 1368-69.
264. Id. at 1371.
265. Id. at 1370.
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Holding an ISP liable would be unreasonable, as it would mean that each
separate server in the global network of computers would also be respon26 6
sible for transmitting the infringing communication.
b.

Contributory and Vicarious Infringement

Courts have also applied theories of contributory and vicarious infringement liability to hold ISPs and BBS operators accountable for their
role in making the infringement happen. Contributory liability was imposed on BBS operators where they provided the facilities, knowledge,
direction, and encouragement for the infringing conduct to occur, despite
lacking knowledge of precisely when unauthorized copies were
downloaded from or uploaded to their BBS by Internet users. 267 Participation in or contribution to the infringing conduct was satisfied where a
service provider knew that infringing material was posted on its network
and yet allowed the information to be stored on its servers for distribution to other servers. 268 Defendants also induced or materially contributed to the infringement when they encouraged users to upload files and,
as a result, benefited from the extensive databank they accumulated for
their subscribers to use. 26 9 Notice of infringement to an ISP satisfied
the "knowledge" requirement and placed a duty on the provider to conduct reasonable investigation and verification of the claim of
270
infringement.
Vicarious liability was enforced against a Web site owner and operator where he owned the Web site, held a position of supervisory authority
over the Web site operations, had the right and the ability to exercise
control over the Web site's infringing activities, and received a direct financial benefit from the Web site business. 2 7 1 However, mere investment in or ownership of the Web site and receipt of profit without some
supervisory authority was insufficient for vicarious infringement. 2 72 Another court held that "rent[ing] space or services on a fixed rental fee
that does not depend on the nature of the activity of the lessee" was insufficient direct financial benefit from the infringing activity. 2 73 Furthermore, no liability was imposed where there was no evidence that
direct infringement by any user of the ISP "in any way enhance[d] the
value of [defendant's] services to subscribers or attractld] new subscribers," or that the defendant's regulation-free Internet access policies drew
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1369.
Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 686-87.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Russ Hardenburgh,982 F. Supp. at 514.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 554.
Id.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
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copyright infringers to do business with the defendant. 2 74
Given the complexity of modern technology and the mechanics of
how Internet content is posted and by whom, the above cases demonstrate how courts resolved issues of what constituted "copying," who
made the unauthorized copy, what level of participation in the infringing
activity was required, and who was held responsible for the infringement
under the traditional copyright regime. These decisions, however, failed
to balance the rights of protection of copyrighted materials with the right
of access to that same material and, rather, seemed skewed in favor of
copyright owners. The literal application of the law to the workings of
the Internet appeared to unfairly burden the pioneers of Cyberspace who
were developing, promoting, and enabling personal and commercial use
of the Internet. A circular argument arose that if the computer commands that enabled the use of the computer to access the Internet and
its many resources by their very nature reproduced and displayed "unauthorized copies," then how could one continue to make available or enjoy
the online offerings without fear of legal liability. As a result, Congress
stepped in with the DMCA to resolve the conflicting opinions about the
role and liability of online activity and, in the process, overruled some
cases and codified others.
3.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")

As a new platform for the exchange of ideas and information, the
Internet proved to be fertile ground for violations of intellectual property
rights that authors have in their copyrighted works. Determining who is
liable for the infringing conduct has been difficult because the direct infringers are often individual end users who are very hard to find or who
are, in many cases, judgment-proof. Other players, such as ISPs or BBS
operators, are easier to identify and many have been held accountable
for their role in making the infringement happen, particularly since they
have the deep pockets to compensate copyright owners whose rights have
been adversely affected. This increased the risk of liability for online
service providers if their subscribers posted content that violated copyright protection. ISPs bear great economic burden to secure their systems as best as possible, particularly in light of the fact that they cannot
possibly monitor all the traffic on their networks and, thus, are usually
unaware of infringing activities on their systems. Consumers also share
the burden because they ultimately bear the cost in the form of higher
fees and charges for Internet connection and other services.
To address these concerns, Congress enacted the DMCA "both to
preserve copyright enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity
to service providers from copyright infringement liability for 'passive,'
274. Id. at 1377.
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'automatic' actions in which a service provider's system engages through
a technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of the
service provider." 2 75 As such, the DMCA overruled the MAI decision
that imposed direct infringement liability for unauthorized copying
where the copy was the result of an automatic transferal of information
from a storage device into a computer's RAM where it could be perceived.
The DMCA also codified the Netcom decision that held that it would be
unreasonable to hold BBS operators directly liable for the infringing acts
of their subscribers and end-users merely because the defendant's "sys27 6
tem incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiffs' works."
To be eligible for protection under the DMCA, the initial criterion is
whether the party seeking protection fits into the statutory definition of
a service provider. The DMCA specifically defines "service provider" to
mean "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of
facilities therefore" 277 and includes any "entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as
sent or received." 2 78 These definitions are broad enough to include such
entities as Netcom Communications, MCI WorldCom, America Online,
CompuServe, Prodigy, Yahoo!, BBSs, corporate intranets, and media
companies that host informational Web sites. 2 79 In addition to providing
Internet access services, many service providers also offer online services
such as operating homepages, Web sites, chat rooms, and bulletin
boards; therefore, the service provider definitions encompass these activities as well. 28 0 Whether providing access to the Internet or supplying
online services, service providers are ultimately supplying content to
their subscribers and, as such, fall within the DMCA definitions.
Weblogs, too, will be included in this category since service providers
are necessary for the establishment and operation of weblogs. Companies that maintain intranets and operate weblogs may also fall within
these definitions. Service providers, such as America Online, are starting to offer their own weblog-hosting services as another way for their
subscribers to retrieve Internet content, much of which is proprietary,
and manipulate it as they wish. The potential for unauthorized use or
275. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing H.R. Conf. Rpt. 105-796, at 72 (1998)).
276. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368; ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
277. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000).
278. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
279. Mitchell P. Goldstein, Service Provider Liability for Acts Committed By Users:
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 591, 609

(2000).
280. Id.
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misuse of the protected content of weblogs may further expose service
providers to infringement liability. In terms of individual liability of
webloggers, it does not appear that the definitions cover webloggers personally since, at that level, webloggers neither operate facilities nor provide Internet access or other online services. Moreover, webloggers do
not control the transmission or routing of online information from one
user to another or manipulate the data being exchanged between users.
The DMCA substantially limits the liability of service providers for
copyright infringement by conferring four "safe harbors" or exemptions
for certain online activities. 28 1 These safe harbors are for: 1) transitory
communications of the service provider in their role as an intermediary
or a "passive conduit" for data as it moves from one point on a network to
another, thus enabling users to post content on the Internet; 28 2 2) system caching whereby temporary copies of frequently requested materials
are automatically made to allow for easier and quicker access to information;28 3 3) storage of user's information residing on the service provider's
system at the direction of a user;28 4 and 4) information location tools,
such as links, that refer users to other Web sites that contain infringing
28 5
information.
Each of these safe harbors has its own conditions and protection
may be sought under any one of them. Where the requirements of the
safe harbors are not met, the DMCA does not apply and traditional
causes of action and defenses may be argued to exempt liability. The safe
harbors limit the relief available against service providers who meet the
conditions and "do not affect the question of ultimate liability under various doctrines of direct, vicarious, and contributory liability. '2 8 6 These
safe harbors encompass weblog activity because service providers are an
intermediary or passive conduit for transporting weblog data, their network allows the maintenance and operation of weblog activity, they store
weblog information on their system for efficient future retrieval by blog281. 17 U.S.C. § 512. This section is also known as the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act.
282. Id. § 512(a). Section 512 (a) exempts service providers "transmitting, routing, or
providing connections for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by
or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that
material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connections." Id.
283. Id. § 512(b)(1). This section refers to the "intermediate and temporary storage of
material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." Id.
284. Id. § 512(c)(1). This exempts "storage at the direction of a user of material that
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." Id.
285. Id. § 512(d). This part applies to the service provider "referring or linking users to
an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link." Id.
286. Id. § 512; Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
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gers and visitors, and they enable weblog links to transfer bloggers and
visitors from one weblog to another.
The DMCA incorporates elements of contributory and vicarious infringement to designate the circumstances under which liability may
arise. It includes knowledge as an element and holds service providers
liable once they are aware that infringing material is transmitted to or
stored on their networks at the direction of users or that links refer users
to other Web sites where infringing material is located. 28 7 The DMCA's
notice-and-take-down provisions mandate that a service provider is not
liable for copyright infringement if, upon having knowledge of or receiving notice of copyright infringement and where the service provider does
not receive a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, the service provider makes a good faith effort to expeditiously take down or
block access to the offending material. 28 8 The DMCA also protects service providers from liability if they respond to a notice of infringement by
disabling access to or removing material that, in fact, turns out to be
2
non-infringing. 89
These provisions also affect weblogs because, as with Web sites,
webloggers and others facilitating blogging, too, can be put on notice that
their blogs contain infringing material, either through direct postings or
via linking, that must be removed promptly. Taking down or deleting
the offending content can be done expeditiously at anytime from anywhere, given the simplicity and speed of posting or editing weblog content. Furthermore, most current blogging activity is non-commercial so
that no direct financial benefit at all is derived from it. However, as the
287. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (c)(1)(A) and (d)(1).
288. Id. § 512(c)(1).
A service provider shall not be liable.. .for infringement of copyright by reason of
the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such
activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement.. .responds expeditiously to remove,
or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
Id.
289. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). No liability for taking down generally -. .. a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service provider's good
faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or
based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of
whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing. Id.
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weblog phenomenon matures, weblogging may assume a more commercial role such that the courts may not be able to easily overlook the revenue being generated from the weblog. Taking care not to use any
infringing content to draw revenue-generating visitors to the weblog may
alleviate the risk of losing the DMCA's protection. For example, profit
from sales or advertisement of clearly infringing content will disqualify
the application of the DMCA. Profit from sales or advertisement of noninfringing material may also adversely influence the court and invalidate shelter under the DMCA if the court finds that the commercial activity is primarily due to visitors who are seeking unauthorized and
illegal material.
The notice-and-take-down requirements dictate that online service
providers qualify for protection under the safe harbors only if they adopt
and reasonably implement a policy of terminating the accounts of their
subscribers who repeatedly engage in copyright infringement and they
notify their subscribers of such policy. 290 To protect themselves, service
providers should post the statutory provisions on their Web sites to inform subscribers and users of the copyright infringement notice requirements and institute procedures whereby copyright holders may report
infringing activities to the service providers. 2 9 1 The DMCA states that
"a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication
provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following ....,,292 Rather than requiring copyright owners
to perfectly comply with the statutorily prescribed notice format, this
and other language merely requires "substantial" compliance and offers
flexibility in terms of what format to follow and how much information to
provide.293
To preserve the privacy of subscribers and users, the DMCA does not
require service providers to monitor their services and subscribers' accounts or actively investigate infringing conduct. 2 94 To protect the
rights of copyright owners, the DMCA dictates that service providers
must "accommodate" and "not interfere with standard technical measures," such as passwords, blocks, encryptions, and firewalls that copy29 5
right owners install to restrict access to copyrighted works.
290. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider ...has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat
infringers. Id.
291. Id. § 512(c)(2).
292. Id. § 512(c)(3)(a) (emphasis added).
293. ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625 (citing various provisions of § 512(c)(3)(A)).
294. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1).
295. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
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Furthermore, the DMCA prohibits circumvention of these technological
measures, such as by decrypting, bypassing, removing, or disabling control devices to gain access to protected material and even makes it illegal
to make or sell any product or service that may be used to circumvent
any copyright protection mechanisms. 2 96 These provisions are designed
to protect and keep in place tools that control access to copyrighted material and may restrict the information that weblogs make accessible to or
receive from viewers.
4.

Post-DMCA

The DMCA legislation is an attempt to provide guidance in cases
involving the responsibilities of and liabilities arising from Internet activities. Weblog owner and operators, entities providing weblog software
and hosting facilities, and online service providers now have a better understanding of the level of participation needed to trigger the DMCA.
However, as the courts are finding, questions of statutory interpretation
and whether entities and conduct fall within the definitions and safe
harbors of the DMCA are surfacing and further challenging Internet experts, practitioners, and courts. Weblogs may rely on the DMCA if they
meet the necessary conditions; otherwise, they may use traditional copyright infringement causes of action and defenses to pursue or defend
against claims of copyright infringement.
a.

Service Provider

The threshold inquiry with regard to shelter under the DMCA is
whether the party seeking protection meets the statutory definitions of
service provider. "The Act defines a service provider broadly" and courts
have similarly applied an expansive interpretation of the statutory language. 29 7 Online service providers that enable access to the Internet
and Web site operators clearly fall within the definitions. 298 It is easily
conceivable that entities that enable Internet access or host and facilitate weblog activities may meet the statutory criteria if they are deemed
a "provider of online services or network access" or offer "transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communica296. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). "No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." Id.; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(3)(A) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000). "No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof, that ... is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title." Id.
297. ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 623; eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; Costar Group, Inc. v.
Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701 (D. MD 2001).
298. Id.; Id.; Id..
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tions."2 9 9 Presently, unlike online service providers, it does not appear
that individual webloggers meet the DMCA definitions and, therefore,
they are outside the reach of the DMCA. However, this may change if
the courts continue to expand the statutory definitions to classify weblog,
as well as Web site, owners as service providers such that they would be
personally liable under the DMCA.
b. Direct Infringement
Courts next analyze any claims arising under the DMCA to determine whether the service provider's online activities fall within one of
the four prescribed safe harbors such as to limit their liability, as well as
examine whatever additional causes of action that have been argued. In
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., the court held that the
DMCA eliminated the direct infringement liability of the defendant ISP
for the passive, automatic acts initiated by the ISP's subscribers. 300 Additionally, Ellison v. Robertson decided that direct infringement liability
was more appropriately applied against those users who actually do the
copying. 30 1 Furthermore, the court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet, Inc.
held that the defendant did not directly infringe plaintiffs copyrighted
works because the defendant "does not use its hardware to either store
the infringing images or move them from one location to another for display" and evidence did not show that defendant used the protected
3 02
materials to create its own works.
The DMCA is very promising for weblogs because it requires them to
actively participate in the infringing conduct, rather than merely supplying space where infringing activity might occur. However, given the
technical simplicity of establishing and maintaining weblogs, courts are
more likely to impose a greater duty of care upon webloggers. Since
webloggers have direct and immediate control over selecting, posting,
and editing the content of weblogs, there is an enhanced risk of a finding
299. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B); 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).
300. ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 622. Plaintiff created and marketed copyrighted adult photographs which were available on the Internet to paying subscribers and which were sold
via CD ROMs and videotapes. Defendant was an ISP that enabled its subscribers to access
and post content on various newsgroups. Some of the postings infringed plaintiffs
copyrights.
301. Ellison v.Robertson, 189 F. Supp, 2d 1051, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Plaintiff was the
owner of copyrighted works that had been illegally copied on the Internet. Defendant Robertson, a subscriber of the defendant ISP AOL's service, uploaded unauthorized copies of
plaintiffs works onto the ISP's servers from which other users could download the infringing copies.
302. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1168-69. Plaintiff operated a Web site that contained
copyrighted adult photos. Defendant offered an online age verification service that comprised of many individual Web sites that paid to be members in the defendant's network.
Some of plaintiffs copyrighted material appeared on defendant's member Web sites.
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of direct infringement liability. Webloggers may be deemed to be in the
best position possible to decide whether what they are about to incorporate into their weblogs is copyrighted such that permission of the owner
is needed or whether their use is such that an exemption may apply.
Moreover, webloggers must not tamper with or circumvent any technological control devices instituted by copyright owners to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted material, nor must they "offer to the public,
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology" that circumvents access
control measures. 30 3 For instance, in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, the Web site operators were held liable for violating the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA when their Web site posted and
offered decryption technology that could be downloaded by users to gain
access to encrypted copyrighted materials. 30 4 While the defendants
themselves did not circumvent any control mechanisms, the information
in their Web site enabled others to do so. Their Web site included links to
other Web sites where the illegal decryption software was located for
users to download. The defendant's actions of urging others to post the
decryption technology, requesting that the defendant be notified of Web
sites that contain the infringing material, checking to verify that those
Web sites actually post the infringing material, and linking their Web
site to those containing the unauthorized copies, amounted to offering,
providing or otherwise trafficking in technology that controls access to
3
protected works. 05
In examining the nature and context of the links, the court found
that where the linked-to Web sites automatically initiate the downloading of the decryption software onto the user's computer or the linked-to
Web site only displays or contains information about downloading the
decryption code, "defendants are engaged in the functional equivalent of
transferring the [decryption] code to the user themselves." 30 6 However,
the result is not so clear if, in addition to providing the decryption
software, the linked-to Web sites also offer other non-infringing content.
In such a case, it would be wrong to presume that, just because the
linked-to Web site somehow somewhere contained infringing material,
the linked-to site offered, provided, or otherwise trafficked in circumven3
tion technology. 07
303. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
304. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). Plaintiffs were motion picture studios who distributed digitally encrypted copyrighted films on DVDs (digital versatile disks). Defendants operated a Web site on which
decryption software was posted for downloading by Internet users and which included
hyperlinks to other Web sites that also contained the decryption software.
305. Id. at 325.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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Webloggers must be careful about the links they incorporate into
their weblogs. Investigating the content of the linked-to weblogs or Web
sites before posting the links may extinguish unnecessary liability, especially if the linked-to location clearly contains infringing content. Even
where the examination does not immediately confirm that the linked-to
blogs or sites contain infringing material, webloggers are still better off
because reviewing for non-infringing content and filtering for unauthorized material will support the assertion that the webloggers have acted
responsibly in providing links to other locations.
c.

Contributory and Vicarious Infringement

Contributory and vicarious infringement liability continues to apply
to online conduct, especially where the DMCA is not argued, where the
activities do not fall within the DMCA, or even when the DMCA is argued, since certain provisions of the Act contain elements of contributory
and vicarious infringement. The Ninth Circuit in A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., held a Web site operator liable for contributory infringement because the defendant: (1) had "actualknowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it could block access
to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to
remove the material" and (2) materially contributed to the direct infringement because defendant "'is an integrated service designed to enable users to locate and download MP3 music files"' and "provides the
'site and facilities"' where direct infringement by its users may occur. 3 08
Contributory infringement was also imposed in Perfect 10 since the defendant had general knowledge of infringement prior to the plaintiffs
filing of the complaint and actual notice of potential and specific infringement upon the plaintiffs filing of the amended complaint, and the defendant materially contributed to the infringement when it marketed its
services, paid commissions, provided content and technical help, moni30 9
tored online activity, and quality-controlled its services.
The Napster court also held the defendant responsible for vicarious
infringement because (1) it had the right and ability to police its system
and control its users' infringing conduct by blocking access to its service
and (2) it received a direct financial benefit from the infringing activities
308. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021-22 (citing the district court's opinion in A & M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919-20 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). The lower court stated
that the defendant "plays a more active role in facilitating file-sharing than an Internet
service provider acting as a passive conduit." Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920. Plaintiffs
were record companies and music publishers who recorded, distributed and sold copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings. Defendant operated an Internet service that facilitated the transmission and retention of copyrighted music files between and
among their users without the permission of the copyright owners.
309. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
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of its users in the form of increased revenues from increased user-base
due to the popularity of the Web site as a draw for users wanting free

music. 3 10 The defendant in Perfect 10 did not fare any better and was

found vicariously liable because it had the right to terminate its arrangement with content providers who posted infringing materials, it controlled users' access to its services and it derived direct financial benefit
from the new customers that the infringing materials drew to defendant's business. 3 1 1 Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's
claims of protection under the DMCA's safe harbors since defendant had
not "'reasonably implemented' a policy directed at terminatingrepeat infringers, even in appropriate circumstances," as mandated by the
3 12
DMCA.
Alternatively, no vicarious liability was imposed in Ellison because
the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant ISP had the right and
ability to supervise the infringing conduct and that the ISP derived direct financial benefit from the infringement. The court reasoned that
"the DMCA requires more than the mere ability to delete and block access to infringing material after that material has been posted in order
for the ISP to be said to have 'the right and ability to control such activity.'

313

The court also determined that, according to the legislative his-

tory of the DMCA, any financial benefit to the ISP was too insignificant
to be classified as a draw or direct financial benefit because "'a service
provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive a 'financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity'
where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing
3 14
users of the provider's service."'
A major issue in Cyberspace is that it is often difficult for ISPs and
BBS operators to immediately and accurately determine when a given
use is legally permissible. Fortunately, the knowledge requirement of
the DMCA reduces liability to only when ISPs and BBS operators have
actual or constructive knowledge that their system is used for infringing
activities. A BBS operator's lack of knowledge will be reasonable and no
liability will be imposed where "a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify
a claim of infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the
lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to
provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a likely infringement." 3 15 Monitoring the large volume of users, the immeasurable
quantity of Internet traffic, and the speed with which Internet traffic is
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74.
Id. at 1179 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512).
Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
Id. at 1063-64 (citing H.R. Rpt. 105-51(11), at p. 54 (July 22, 1998)).
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374; 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1), 512(g)(1).
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added, deleted, and modified would drain the resources of ISPs. 3 16 In

addition, the current practices of the Copyright Office make it difficult to
determine whether copyright exists in a particular work, thus contribut3 17
ing to the uncertainty of whether infringement has occurred.
Weblogs and entities associated with weblogs, such as weblog
software providers, corporations running corporate blogs and ISPs enabling Internet access, are a likely target for contributory and vicarious
infringement. A significant characteristic of weblogs is that they can be
designed to be interactive so that weblog visitors may be able to add
their own comments and criticisms. Unfortunately, an unforeseen side
effect of this feature is that weblogs may serve as a potential vehicle for
the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works.
For instance, companies that operate blogs may be risking liability if
their blogs are shared with the companies' employees and consumers
who may end up contributing content that is copyright protected and not
authorized for use by law or the copyright owner. This may add to the
heightened scrutiny that webloggers will already be subject to because,
since they have enabled others to post potentially infringing content,
they will be charged with the duty to review and filter any postings that
violate another's copyright protection.
Moreover, unlike ISPs and BBS operators, weblog owners and operators bear a heightened risk of liability. They have more knowledge of
and control over the design and content of their weblogs. They are also
in a better position to monitor the activities of Internet users who are
given access to the weblogs, particularly if the weblogs are designed to be
interactive and users are encouraged to make their contribution. The
simplicity of weblog editing can quickly and easily remove any infringing
material found on weblogs. Webloggers can even utilize various technological control measures, such as blocking or disabling, to prevent infringing activities from occurring on their sites. As such, weblogs will be
subject to greater scrutiny should an issue of infringement arise. Failure
to take remedial action would run afoul of the mandates of the law.
Contributory or vicarious infringement liability has also arisen in
linking cases. In Bernstein v. J.C. Penny, Inc., the copyright owner's

complaint of contributory infringement was dismissed against the defendant whose Web site was indirectly hyperlinked to a Web site that
posted infringing copies of plaintiff's protected works after the court determined that "multiple linking does not constitute substantial participation in any infringement where the linking Web site does not mention
the fact that Internet users could, by following the links, find infringing
316. Kane, supra n. 220, at 195.
317. Id.
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material on another Web site."3 18 Another case, Intellectual Reserve,
Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, held the defendants liable for contributory infringement because their conduct actively contributed to the direct infringement by Internet users. 3 19 While the defendants' Web site
itself did not contain the infringing content, the Web site did inform
users that the material was available on the Internet, it provided the
Internet addresses of other Web sites that contained the unauthorized
copies and it even offered instructions on how to successfully access the
infringing material. 320 With the information gleaned from the defendants' Web site, users were able to browse other Web sites containing the
illegal material and, in the process, cause unauthorized copies to 3be
21
made on their computers so that the infringing works could be viewed.
These decisions are very significant for weblogs since linking to
other blogs or Web sites is a hallmark of weblogs. It appears that linking
alone is generally insufficient to trigger copyright infringement. However, links that are accompanied with information or instructions as to
the availability or accessibility of infringing content on other weblogs
may invoke heightened scrutiny and accountability. Weblogs containing
links that transfer weblog visitors to other weblogs on which infringing
content is located and where the links automatically start the unauthorized copying process, without any prompts from the visitors are more
susceptible to a finding of infringement. In practice, most links are not
automatically authorized by the linked-to Web sites and only a few situa3 22
tions exist where linking and cross-linking agreements are executed.
Of course, the prudent course of action for bloggers is to initially seek
permission from the weblog or Web site to which a link is desired and, at
least, scan the content of the linked-to Web site for obvious signs of copyright infringement. Of course, the problem for those unfamiliar with
copyright issues, is that it may be difficult to ascertain whether or not
the material is copyright protected and whether specific uses are infringing or non-infringing.
318. Bernstein v. J.C. Penny, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1063, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Plaintiff
was the copyright owner of photographs that were reproduced on the Internet without the
plaintiff's permission. Defendants operated a Web site that was indirectly linked to another Web site that contained the infringing material.
319. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294
(D. Utah 1999). Plaintiffs owned copyrighted materials that were reproduced on various
Web sites without the authorization of the plaintiffs. Defendants operated a Web site that
offered information to users about accessing the plaintiffs protected works via those Web
sites that contained the infringing works and even provided direct links to those sites.
320. Id. at 1295.
321. Id. at 1294.
322. Simona Kiritsov, Can Millions of Internet Users Be Breaking the Law Every Day?:
An Intellectual PropertyAnalysis of Linking and Framingand the Need for Licensing, 2000
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2000).
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Webloggers may not be able to hide behind the false sense of security
that the vast expanse of Cyberspace will shield them from being detected
and held accountable. Modern technology is making it easier to track,
identify, and hold liable individual users who are directly responsible for
the infringing activities. Copyright owners are utilizing technological
tools to alert users to copyright protection notices and block copying by
unauthorized users. They are also becoming more vigilant in the monitoring of and enforcement against infringing actions. Public awareness of
copyright laws is also helping Internet users to exercise caution before
clicking and copying Internet content. As such, courts may be less likely
to excuse Internet-savvy webloggers who may be presumed to know or
have the means to know whether their conduct implicates copyright law.

D. DEFENSES
The Copyright Act seeks to balance the public and private interests
of controlling access to creative works. As such, the law imposes specific
limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners and provides certain affirmative defenses designed to protect the right of the public to
access and use protected materials. As technology has developed, new
mediums of expression have been introduced and new opportunities for
infringement have been presented. While the law has adjusted to incorporate such changes, Cyberspace cases have not been easily resolved.
Where traditional legal standards have proven ineffective, additional
laws have been devised to address Internet issues. Defenses applicable
in real-world cases have also been applied to online activities involving
ISPs, BBSs, Web site owners and operators, and individual users.
Weblogs too may benefit from these defenses but caution should be exercised since post-DMCA case law is still in its infancy and decisions have
to be monitored to determine how courts are interpreting and applying
the DMCA and whether traditional causes of action are subjected to new
or different assessment.
1.

Fair Use

The test for determining whether use of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use is:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use3 upon the potential market for or value of the copy32
righted work.

323. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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Excluded from copyright infringement is use of protected material "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ324
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."
The Supreme Court stated that all of these factors "are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."3 25 The Court acknowledged that the "fair use doctrine . .
'permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law
is designed to foster.'" 3 26 A fair use defense can only be asserted when
327
the defendant possesses a legitimate copy of a protected work.
a.

Purpose and Characterof Use

Appropriating copyrighted material for commercial purposes alone
will not defeat a fair use defense. 3 28 If, however, financial benefit is derived from the infringing activity, fair use may be denied. 32 9 For example, a BBS operator, making possible the uploading and downloading of
unauthorized copies of video games so that users can avoid purchasing
them, is not making fair use of the copyrighted material. 330 Similarly, a
Web site operator engages in commercial use when its network enables
anonymous users to freely download and upload copyrighted music without authorization of the copyright holders so that they avoid purchasing
the music. 33 1 But, where an ISP's purpose is not to supply or solicit Internet content that infringes a copyrighted work, where there is no monetary gain from the Internet content that is available to its subscribers,
and where it is nearly impossible to obtain permission for every use of
33 2
the copyrighted work, a court may find fair use.
Given these holdings, weblogs may have trouble meeting this element because they have the potential for commercial use and some may
already be profiting from their online activities. In determining whether
direct financial benefit accrues from the infringing conduct, a court may
look for monetary gain from banner ads and sponsoring or selling products or services and non-monetary gain from freely offering or making
available products or services, linking to other weblogs or Web sites, and
soliciting donations. It is likely that commercial use may even extend to
where the weblogs' infringing activities make it particularly famous or
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 687.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1379.
Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 687.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1379.
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notorious such that its popularity draws many visitors. Bloggers must
be mindful of weblog content that may raise suspicions of commercial
activity.
In addition to determining whether a profit is gained from the infringing use, a court will look to whether the use of the copyrighted work
is "transformative" such that it "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." 3 33 The more transformative the new work is, the
greater the likelihood that fair use will be found. It was recently held
that linking to the actual thumbnail-sized duplicates of copyrighted photographs constitutes fair use because the reduction changed the charac334
ter of the original pictures and was not used for commercial gain.
However, linking to the full-sized original photos located on the plaintiffs Web site was not fair use because the full-sized originals had not
been transformed by the defendant into a new creative work and most
visitors to the defendant's Web site who clicked on the link to the fullsized pictures would not know that they had left the defendant's Web
site given that the full-sized originals were formatted by the defendant
3 35
and surrounded by the defendant's advertisers.
Many purposes of using copyrighted material in weblogs fall
squarely within the exemptions of the fair use defense. Most weblogs to
date are online journals that contain personal commentary and criticism
of the authors. Others are used for education and research purposes.
Still others are a modern form of online journalism or news reporting.
Most, if not all, weblogs are non-commercial entities that do not derive
financial benefit from their online activities. Even if some weblogs were
characterized as commercial and did profit from their Internet acts, it is
unlikely that the profit would be earned from the infringing conduct itself. Weblog content may also qualify as transformative since the
coyprighted works are usually woven into the author's own commentary
or criticism so as to communicate the desired message.
b.

Nature of the Copyrighted Work

This factor considers the degree to which the copied work is creative
or factual. Works that are fiction, fantasy, and have entertainment or
333. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
334. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d. 934, 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff was a
photographer who maintained a Web site to advertise, sell, and license his work. Defendant operated a search engine and used a computer program to search the Internet for
photographs to place in its database. The photographs were not downloaded to defendant's
own server but were instead copied and then reduced to thumbnail-size before being placed
on defendant's Web site. The thumbnail photos were linked to plaintiff's Web site where
users could view the full-sized originals.
335. Id. at 948.
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artistic value, such as video games and original photographs, may be accorded copyright protection. 33 6 Works composed of basic facts, such as
historical, scientific, biographical, and daily news, are not subject to protection because they "do not owe their origin to an act of authorship" and
are part of the public domain and accessible to all. 3 37 However, factual
compilations may be copyrighted if the data is selected, coordinated and
arranged such that it meets the "originality" requirement of the Copyright Act.3 3 s Different uses of weblogs such as education, news, or criticism will dictate what aspects of the protected works will be copied.
Facts may be freely borrowed to create new works in weblogs but creative expressions should be used more carefully as they are guarded and
scrutinized more closely.
c.

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

This element is analyzed in conjunction with the purpose and character of the use because some cases justify complete copying versus other
cases that borrow no more than is necessary. 33 9 Uploading and
downloading music files "'involves copying the entirety of the copyrighted work."' 340 Even where a portion of the copyrighted material is
taken, courts will not find fair use if what is borrowed contains "the
heart" of the original protected work. 3 4 1 While ISPs enable exact copying of what is initially posted by Internet users, they can be found to
have copied no more than is necessary to allow them to provide Internet
access services, particularly since there is no other way to accomplish the
functions of an ISP. 3 4 2 Linking to full-sized photographs would amount
to borrowing the heart of the original, whereas, linking to thumbnail
images would not. 3 43 Depending upon the context in which the borrowed
material is used, the quantity and quality of what a weblog borrows may
satisfy this element.
d.

Effect of Use Upon the PotentialMarket for the Work

This factor examines any adverse impact on the market for the origi3 44
nal work as well as the markets for secondary or derivative works.
The nature of the Internet is such that unauthorized copying may have a
"substantial and immeasurable adverse effect on the market" for the pro336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 687; Kelly, 280 F.3d at 942-43.
Feist Publications,499 U.S. at 347-48.
Id. at 348.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1380.
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 943, 948.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
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tected material. 3 45 For instance, the adverse effects on the value of video
games will be significant if they are available for unauthorized copying
on a BBS. 34 6 Similarly, linking to full-sized copyrighted photographs

harms the market for the originals by depriving the owner of the financial benefits from advertising, selling, and licensing the protected
works. 34 7 Weblogs may not satisfy this element if evidence shows that
demand for copyrighted works may cease if people can access the same
material on weblogs at little or no cost. Currently, it is unlikely that
weblogs invade or replace the traditional markets for the original, secondary, or derivative works but future weblog activities may not provide
such guarantees.
The policy behind the fair use doctrine is to eliminate the transaction costs associated with obtaining a license from the copyright owner
for every use of the protected material, and to promote efficiency by allowing uses of copyrighted materials in cases where a reasonable copyright holder would give permission. 3 48 The fair use defense may be
applied where "the purpose of the use is beneficial to society, complete
copying is necessary given the type of use, the purpose of the use is completely different than the purpose of the original, and there is no evidence that the use will significantly harm the market for the
original." 34 9 Since the fair use defense only applies to claims of copyright infringement, it is not relevant in cases involving circumvention of
control technology. As noted below, in enacting the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, Congress intentionally excluded the fair use
justification and, instead, granted a limited number of other defenses.
The fair use doctrine provides much support for current weblog activities because most, if not all, uses of copyrighted material may satisfy
the above elements. However, once weblogs become more commercial in
nature and generate monetary and non-monetary gains, fair use may be
harder to defend. In addition, webloggers must be aware that technological barriers such as blocks, passwords and firewalls installed to prevent
unauthorized copying or linking on the Internet may cut against a fair
use defense because the use of such tools would signify the copyright
owners' intent to prevent unpermitted uses of their protected works. 3 50
A stronger fair use defense may arise where technology does not prevent
copying or linking to online content.
345. Sega Enter., 857 F. Supp. at 688.
346. Id.
347. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 948.
348. Kiritsov, supra n. 322, at 4.
349. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1380.
350. Kiritsov, supra n. 322, at 5.
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Implied License

An affirmative defense to a charge of copyright infringement is the
doctrine of implied license under which the conduct of the copyright
owner may indicate an implicit agreement to use the protected work. It
can be argued that one who posts material on a Web site expressly or
impliedly licenses the right to browse, copy, and link to the Web site. 35 1
Most Internet content is intended for general accessibility and does not
alert users that materials may be copyrighted nor does it include warnings about copyright infringement for unauthorized use.3 52 Publishing
content on an open and unsecured network, without some evidence that
the information contained within is copyright protected, is an implied
3 53
invitation to visit the site.
For this defense to apply, weblog owners, operators, and hosts must
overcome the following hurdles: licenses can only be granted by legitimate copyright owners, they can be explicitly disclaimed, and they can
3 54
be subject to the terms and conditions set by the copyright owners.
The use of technological control measures or lack of prior consent to pre355
vent copying or linking may diffuse an implied license argument.
Courts are likely to examine the customs and practices of Internet pub3 56
lishers as evidence of whether or not an implied license is granted.
3.

Digital Millennium CopyrightAct ("DMCA")

The four safe harbors granted to service providers in Section 512 of
the DMCA may serve as a defense to online copyright infringement and
may limit liability only if the service providers comply with the statutory
provisions. These exceptions designate the type of technical and
mechanical computer and Internet processes that qualify for immunity,
the role and functions the service providers must perform, the responsibilities imposed upon copyright owners with regard to notification of alleged infringement, and the duties of service providers once they have
actual or constructive knowledge or received notice that their system or
network is potentially used for infringing activities. As the court in Ellison stated, the DMCA only mandates that service providers alert users
to the policy of denial of service for repeat infringement of copyright protection; it does not require that service providers actually monitor the
activities of its users for infringing conduct or terminate the accounts of
351. Lemley, supra n. 236, at 567; Tsilas, supra n. 60, at 89.
352. Kiritsov, supra n. 322, at 4.
353. Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1273, 1331 (2001).
354. Lemley, supra n. 236, at 567.
355. Sableman, supra n. 353, at 1331; Kiritsov, supra n. 322, at 5.
356. Sableman, supra n. 353, at 1331.
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subscribers who are repeat infringers. 35 7
The Hendrickson v. eBay court determined that the defendant qualified for the safe harbor relating to "storage at direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider" because the plaintiff copyright owner failed to substantially comply with the DMCA when he refused to identify specific
item numbers of copyrighted materials that were allegedly being offered
for sale on the defendant's auction Web site. 3 58 "The limited information
that Plaintiff provided to eBay cannot, as a matter of law, establish actual or constructive knowledge that particular listings were involved in
infringing activity."3 59 The fact that the defendant received a payment
for enabling the advertisement and any subsequent sale, that the defendant was able to block access to Web site content and that the defendant
voluntarily monitored its Web site for apparent infringements did not
amount to the defendant's "right and ability to control" the infringing
3 60
conduct, as required by the statute.
The Ellison decision also held that the defendant ISP's conduct fell
within this safe harbor since the defendant had adopted and implemented a "Terms of Service" policy that every subscriber must agree to,
which notified them of the prohibition against infringement of intellectual property rights and termination of service for unauthorized copying.36 1 Furthermore, the defendant met the safe harbor for "transitory
digital network communications" because one of its users initiated the
transmission of the infringing material, it did not choose or select any of
the content that was transmitted through its system, it did not select the
recipients of any material, and it did not in any way modify the informa3 62
tion that was transmitted though its system.
Conversely, in ALS Scan, the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant did not qualify for the "storage at the direction of a user" safe harbor because the plaintiff copyright owner substantially complied with the
statutory notification requirements when it: "(1) identified two sites created for the sole purpose of publishing ALS Scan's copyrighted works, (2)
asserted that virtually all the images at the two sites were its copy357. Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
358. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. Plaintiff claimed to be copyright owner of a documentary that was allegedly being offered for sale without his permission on defendant's
Web site. Defendant operated an Internet auction Web site that enabled sellers and buyers
to transact their business without any intervention from eBay. eBay received a fee for each
advertisement that a seller posted and a percentage of the highest bid at which the item
was sold.
359. Id. at 1093.
360. Id. at 1093-94 (citing § 512(c)(1)(B)).
361. Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
362. Id. at 1070-71.
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righted material, and (3) referred [defendant ISP] RemarQ to two web
addresses where RemarQ could find pictures of ALS Scan's models and
obtain ALS Scan's copyright information." 363 Similarly, the Perfect 10
court determined that there was little likelihood of the defendant meeting the requirements of this safe harbor, or the one for information location tools such as web browsers and links, where the defendant failed to
tailor and implement a policy against copyright infringement that substantially complied with the DMCA.3 6 4 The defendant's unreasonable

and inflexible conduct in requiring copyright owners to strictly adhere to
the defendant's own notice of infringement policy and in not accommodating those who substantially complied with its policy went well beyond
the dictates of the DMCA. 36 5 Moreover, the defendant derived financial

benefit directly from the infringing material in the form of new visitors
who paid to access the infringing content via defendant's
and subscribers
36 6
service.
The provisions of the DMCA concerning prohibition against circumvention of access control technology are not subject to a claim of fair use
defense. The fair use exemption is only available in copyright infringement actions and not in cases involving circumvention of control devices.
The legislative history of the DMCA indicates that the "decision not to
make fair use a defense to a claim under Section 1201(a) was quite deliberate."36 7 Congress did recognize that "technological controls on access to
copyrighted works might erode fair use by preventing access even for
3 68
uses that would be deemed 'fair' if only access might be granted."
Therefore, Congress incorporated several built-in exceptions or defenses
to circumvention of control technology for specific uses that qualified as
"fair," such as certain uses by libraries, archives and educational instituengineering, security testing and good faith encryptions and for reverse
36 9
tion research.
The DMCA may be used as a sword or a shield. Copyright owners
may use it as a sword to argue that the accused may not limit their liability under the DMCA because the accused does not meet the threshold
service provider or safe harbor conditions or, if they did satisfy these conditions, they did not satisfy other mandates of the DMCA. The accused
may use it as a shield to show that the copyright owner did not comply
the statutory notice requirements that would have alerted the accused to
the claim of infringement; therefore, their failure to expeditiously re363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80.
Id.
Id. at 1181.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
Id.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d), (f), (g), Wi).
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move the offending material did not expose them to liability under the
DMCA. In a claim of circurpvention to access control technology, the accused may also use it as a shield to point that their conduct is excused
under one of the exemptions to the DMCA. For instance, the defendant
in Reimerdes offered the defenses of reverse engineering, security testing, and encryption research but the court denied these claims due to
3 70
insufficient evidence to indicate otherwise.
Whatever the case, the first line of defense for weblogs and entities
associated with weblogging is the DMCA, which was specifically enacted
to address and limit online liability. As with Web sites, weblogs and entities associated with weblogging may easily qualify as service providers,
fall within one or more of the safe harbors and meet the notice-and-takedown provisions. But, unlike Web sites, weblogs bear an enhanced burden of responsibility and heightened scrutiny since they are quick and
easy to design and operate, they do not require knowledge of computer
programming, such as HTML, they eliminate the necessity of a systems
administrator or web master, and there is always direct and immediate
access to the weblog content for updating and editing. This setup may
impose a greater duty of care upon weblogs, especially if bloggers are
perceived as more sophisticated and Internet-savvy than the average
users.

E.

CONCLUSION

As the framers of the Constitution intended, the ultimate goal of
copyright law is to advance the intellectual knowledge of a society. To
accomplish this, authors of original creative works are rewarded for their
efforts with copyright protection so that, for a limited time, they can reap
the benefits of their investment before the works become part of the public domain. That others may be encouraged to contribute their own ideas
if their works are protected adds to the collective pool of public knowledge. The law also enables the public to access these creative protected
works so long as certain procedures and policies are followed. This fine
balance has been difficult to maintain with the advent of Internet Web
sites, web pages and, now, weblogs. The urge to devise new laws to address Cyberspace cases has largely been resisted by adherence to traditional legal standards and tests.
Unfortunately, the law often assumes that the average Internet user
is sophisticated enough to understand the do's and don't's of copyright
law. Therefore, it is imperative that webloggers proceed carefully.
When selecting and posting content on weblogs, webloggers must be cautious because the copyrights held by others may curtail the webloggers'
own freedom of expression and creativity. Although most current weblog
370. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-22.
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activities may be protected by one of the exemptions to copyright infringement, future uses of weblogs may trigger serious violations. Increased commercial or sponsorship activities from which weblogs derive
financial benefits are one way to attract heightened scrutiny. Official
Web sites may incorporate weblogs into their overall marketing and
sales strategy, thus, incurring additional responsibility and liability.
The Internet has tempted many users to make unauthorized uses of
copyrighted materials. It has forced copyright holders to become more
vigilant in monitoring and enforcing their rights. Technological improvements are assisting both users and copyright owners in their respective
endeavors. Congress, too, has taken action with the enactment of the
DMCA to address the liability of service providers for their own as well
as their subscribers' online conduct. Copyright law does not seek to completely bar the use of protected materials, it just seeks to stay abreast of
the latest medium of expression and ensure that both the public and private rights are afforded proper protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

Weblogs are the latest phenomena to hit Cyberspace and are a revolutionary medium of expression. The simplicity, speed, and low cost of
publishing content on the Internet is the driving force behind the rising
popularity of weblogs. The weblog technology does away with knowing
computer programming and eliminates the need for intermediaries, such
as webmasters or web content managers, to establish and maintain
weblogs. As such, weblogs lose a crucial layer of protection that is provided by a middleman who may be eligible for shelter under the safe
harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. For the average Internet user, the participation of an intermediary who monitors the content to be posted, warns against potentially infringing content, filters for
protected material, and mediates when claims of infringement arise
plays an important function. Modern tools that can track individual
users are also putting bloggers at risk of being easily detected and held
directly accountable for infringing conduct. The false sense of security
and anonymity associated with Cyberspace is fast becoming a thing of
the past since technology is enabling efficient identification of direct
infringers.
Once weblog technology matures, the potential for blogging is unlimited. Weblog activity may shift from the mostly non-commercial current
use to more commercial use. Individuals may utilize weblogs to market
products or services or engage in fundraising. Businesses that lack resources to venture into electronic commerce may realize the benefits of
weblogs as an alternative to traditional Web sites. Companies that operate official Web sites may incorporate weblogs into their overall business
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plan to better serve existing customers as well as expand the overall consumer base. Researchers may utilize weblogs for consumer surveys and
data collection. Whatever the reason or the need, blogging may just be
the answer.
As with other Internet issues, practitioners, courts, Internet experts,
and end users must be mindful that weblogs will also be subject to the
provisions of trademark and copyright law. Intellectual property rights
of others may affect and even hinder the weblogger's own freedom of expression and creation. Trademarks and copyright are intellectual creative endeavors that are recognized as valuable assets and protected as
proprietary interests. The purpose of awarding these property rights is
to encourage contributions to the collective pool of knowledge that promotes the progress of society as a whole. The goals of trademark and
copyright law are essentially to acknowledge and attribute proprietary
works to their rightful owners, alert the public and prevent confusion as
to source or sponsorship of protected materials, recognize the investment
that went into developing and promoting the creative works, reward a
monopoly on the intellectual creations to recoup the investment, and provide remedies should these property rights be misappropriated or misused. The law aims to balance the competing interests of preserving the
rights of the owners of the protected works with those of the right of the
public to freely access information in the public domain.
While legal tests for determining "likelihood of confusion," "commercial use," and "copying" are continuously evolving to incorporate modern
technologies, there is still great uncertainty as to how a court may interpret these standards given the facts of the case at hand. Defenses such
as fair use, implied license and the DMCA do not guarantee victory in all
cases, even though they may excuse most uses of protected material in
weblogs as noninfringing use. The type and amount of intellectual property "borrowed," the subsequent use that is made of the protected material, and the technical methods by which information is routed to and
ultimately posted on the Internet are key factors. Weblogs that are active and that engage in commercial activity are at greater risk. Entities
that allow their computer hardware and software to be used to transmit
or store weblog content will also be subject to enhanced scrutiny in determining the extent of their liability for the infringing conduct. Protecting
the public and private interests has become increasingly complex.
Intellectual property owners are aggressively pursuing Cyber pirates and going after several entities as defendants in lawsuits. The author or creator of a weblog who publishes unauthorized content on a
weblog may be liable as a direct infringer. The manufacturer, developer
or marketer of computers and software that enable weblogging activity
that contains unpermitted postings may be accountable as a contributory
or vicarious infringer. The Internet service provider or weblog host that
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provides space on their server for a weblog that illegally incorporates
protected material is also a potential contributory or vicarious infringer.
The advertiser of a product or service or the solicitor of donations or
other benefits is yet another target if the weblog contains infringing content. Even links to and from a weblog expose the owners and operators
of the linked-to and linked-from Web sites to liability.
It is unpredictable how far the law will reach to recognize and protect owners' rights. As a precaution, the simplest solution against infringing someone's intellectual property rights is to obtain the
permission of the owner. Awareness of intellectual property laws is encouraging intellectual property owners to utilize self-help mechanisms
such as posting notices if material is protected, installing tools to block
unauthorized access, and providing information for requesting authorization to use protected content or reporting violations. This protects
owners because they have put the Internet public on notice that specific
content is protected and helps Internet users find owners from whom
they can seek authorization to use the desired intellectual property.
Weblogs are here to stay and will only increase in popularity as more
and more people hear about them. The ability to post content that instantly becomes available to the global Internet community quickly and
cheaply is an incredible technological development. Gone are the days of
relying on programming gurus to translate your communication into
computer code before it could be published. The complete freedom to
blog as you please is at your fingertips, just as long as you bear in mind
the legal hazards that might be lurking behind your next click. So, go out
there and blog your way into Cyberspace!
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